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ABSTRACT
Both of Sri Lanka’s post-independence, autochthonous, republican constitutions have
contained within their pages a directive which declares that “Buddhism shall have foremost
place”. The framers of Sri Lanka’s constitution insisted that this was simply an
acknowledgement of the “special” place of Buddhism in the fabric of Sri Lanka’s history.
However, recent history has shown this provision being used directly and indirectly to deny
portions of Sri Lankans their fundamental rights. The victims of this provision belong both
to the majority and minority religions. The question this thesis attempted to answer was:
does Sri Lanka’s duty to Buddhism under Article 9 of the Constitution conflict with its
duties to its citizens under fundamental rights provisions? This thesis argues that (i) such a
conflict does exist and (ii) where it arises the state has time after time prioritized the
promotion and protection of Buddhism over protecting its citizens’ fundamental rights, and
that this has in turn affected the state’s ability to deal neutrally with its citizens. Four
instances of this conflict are examined in detail: the restrictions placed on proselytization,
the Deeghavapi case, the child monk and the re-imposition of a ban on women’s ability to
purchase alcohol. This thesis further argues that legal and political protections afforded to
religious minorities, such as personal laws and special laws are insufficient to protect the
rights of vulnerable groups within those minorities and instead serve to promote
communalism.

Key words: religious states, preferred religions, endorsed religions, state-religion
relationships, human rights, constitutional duties, conflict of duties, constitutional law,
freedom of religion, state neutrality, child monk, personal laws, minority rights, Sri Lanka.
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RELIGION, STATE, AND
A CONFLICT OF DUTIES
A CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM IN SRI LANKA.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Both of Sri Lanka’s autochthonous, republican constitutions have contained within their
pages a directive to grant Buddhism “foremost place”. The framers of Sri Lanka’s
constitution insisted that this directive was simply an acknowledgement of the “special
place” of Buddhism in Sri Lanka’s history. However, recent history has shown Article 9
(which grants Buddhism foremost place) being used as justification, directly and indirectly,
to deny portions of Sri Lankan citizens their fundamental rights. The citizens affected
belong both to the majority religion and to minority religions. For example child monks,
periodically recruited for temples by the state, are forced to give up joy and childhood.
This illustrates a complex constitutional problem: the exceptionalism and harm that a
conflict of duty breeds when a state is duty bound to both a religion and human rights.
The child monk is only one example of this conflict of duties created by the Constitution
of Sri Lanka. The central question this thesis attempts to answer is: does Sri Lanka’s duty
to Buddhism, as privileged by Article 9 of the Constitution, conflict with its duties and
responsibilities to its citizens under fundamental human rights provisions? In this thesis I
argue that where Sri Lanka has faced this conflict the state has often prioritized the
promotion and protection of Buddhism over protecting human rights, and that this has in
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turn affected the state’s ability to deal neutrally with its citizens. Although Sri Lanka, on

paper appears to subscribe to a kind of substantive neutrality because of the personal law
system in Sri Lanka that permits minority religions and ethnic communities’ autonomy on
certain topics like marriage, this autonomy, combined with community based politics, has
cultivated communalism, which has in turn weakened protection for groups such as women
within minority religions.
This question is examined in three parts: Part One (Chapter 1) contains an introduction
and a brief literature review to provide an orientation to the problem. Part two (Chapter 2
and Chapter 3) contains an analysis of conflicts within the constitution of Sri Lanka and
why Sri Lanka's constitution promised Buddhism foremost place. Part two also looks at Sri
Lanka's colonial legal history and laws following that time, and at the history and conditions
that led to conflict in Sri Lanka. This part contains an examination of four legal situations
where the conflict between the dual obligations and duties that human rights and Buddhism
place on Sri Lanka occurs. The third part of this thesis (Chapter 4) examines how the
dominant religion and minority religious communities have carved out political power.
This thesis will focus mainly on states that give a religion preferential treatment and states
that give a specific religion state support.1 I use the term “religious states” as shorthand to

1

Jeroen Temperman. "The Neutral State: Optional or Necessary?: A Triangular Analysis of State–Religion
Relationships, Democratisation and Human Rights Compliance" (2006) 1:3 Religion & Human Rights at
277-278. Temperman’s spectrum of state-religion relationships offers a clear and workable categorisation.
Temperman expands on the model originally put forward by Cole Durham in Cole Durham, "Perspectives
on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework" in Johann Van der Vyver & John Witte, ed, Religious
Human Rights in Global Perspective, ed (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996) at 12. I have chosen
Temperman’s spectrum as opposed to Durham’s continuum because Temperman further expands Durham’s
categorisations into several more distinct regimes. This thesis focuses only on some of those regimes.
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refer to this group of state-religion relationships. I annex the adjective “religious” to the
noun “state” to simply denote a connection between religious organizations and the state.2
It is important to note that I exclude theocratic states from this thesis for the reason that
theocratic states generally do not claim to uphold liberal democratic values within their
territory. In theocratic states, the religious laws are state laws; religious doctrine and state
doctrine are one. Generally, the only kind of conflicts in such systems are conflicts internal
to the religion, and as such are excluded from this thesis. I also exclude an analysis of states
that possess a strict, substantive, structural and constitutional separation between state and
religion.
Accompanying this conflict are the national battles on the world stage. The genocide of
Rohingya Muslims, Bangladeshi anti-Hindu violence, Sri Lanka’s Buddhist extremist riots
– these events and the sudden emergence of others like them around the world have
renewed discussions about the role of religion within the state. An important feature of
these events is accusations of state involvement in the violence. Given these accusations
and the level of violence and suffering that religious extremism can spawn in a state within
hours, it is important to define the role of the state in respect to religion, and the
mechanisms in place to prevent violence in the name of religion. Although this thesis
focuses on Sri Lanka, the analysis contained in this thesis has significance globally,
especially for post-colonial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious states such as Myanmar and India

2

I use an Oxford English Dictionary definition of “religious”: “of a thing, a place, etc.: belonging to or
connected with a monastic order”. Oxford English Dictionary, religious, ed (Oxford University Press).
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which have been struggling to come out of their pre-democratic identity and colonial
history while trying not to sink into communalism.

Context
The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief recognized that
a global study of religious restrictions and social hostility motivated by religion
or belief illustrated a strong correlation between the degree to which a
Government is entangled with religion and its propensity for protecting or
violating freedom of religion or belief and/or combating religious intolerance.
Some 24 (58.5 per cent) of the 41 States with an official State religion in that
study imposed “very high” or “high” levels of restrictions on religious practices,
while 11 (27.5 per cent) of the 40 States with favoured religion(s), imposed such
restrictions in the period 2014–2015. Moreover, only 5 (4.9 per cent) of the 102
States that did not identify with religion engaged in these levels of interference
with the prerogatives of religious communities, while all 10 of the States that
had a negative view of the role of religion in public life in these studies imposed
“high” or “very high” restrictions.3
States that endorse a religion, by their nature, give primacy to one religion above others. 4
These religions usually have a history of political and social hegemony within those states
and the specification of a state religion is often an effort to preserve such a state’s historical
identity. Meanwhile for various reasons such as international pressure, or demands by their
citizenry, states also desire to move towards being modern democratic liberal states.
However, implementing the mechanisms of the modern democratic state also means giving
effect to human rights (the implementation of which is associated with a “successful”
modern liberal democratic state). Most early international human rights documents largely

3

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion and belief, 37th Sess,
UN Doc A/HRC/37/49 (28th February 2018) citing Pew Research Center, “Global Restrictions on Religion
Rise Modestly in 2015, Reversing Downward Trend” (Washington, D.C., April 2017).
4 Jeroen Temperman, supra note 1 at 273. Temperman notes that a “state can be considered defacto nonsecular in case a single church or religion has a (profound) privilege position in practice.”
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have their roots in enlightenment principles and documents birthed during and out of
European revolutions.5 These contained civil liberties such as the right to equality, the
freedom of expression, the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and the right to
life. According to Paul Gordon Lauren, these values (human rights) “came from many
sources, and religious belief provided only one of these. Others came from ethical values
originating in moral and political philosophy, derived not so much from divine revelation
but from secular inquiry and human reason.”6 The evolution of human rights on secular
grounds, independent of its former tethers to religion may conflict with the values, requires,
and structures of religions.
Further complicating this conflict is the extra-legal position that religion occupies in politics,
society and culture. Religious institutions enjoy privileges such as tax exemptions. Religious
institutions often enjoy powers that enable them to control their congregations free from
state interference. Additionally, some contemptible religious practices go unquestioned,

5Jack

R Censer & Lynn Hunt. “The Enlightenment and Human Rights”, Liberty Equality, and Fraternity:
Exploring the French Revolution, online: <http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/exhibits/show/liberty--equality-fraternity/enlightenment-and-human-rights>. Censer and Hunt observe that “The lasting importance of
the Declaration of Rights [the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen 1789] is immediately
evident: just compare the first article from August 1789 with the first article in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights passed by the United Nations after World War II, on 10 December 1948. They are very
similar, though the UN document refers to "human beings" in place of "men."” Also: Shami Chakrabarti,
“Magna Carta and Human Rights”, (9 February 2015), The British Library, online: <https://www.bl.uk/magnacarta/articles/magna-carta-and-human-rights>: The UDHR also drew upon the Magna Carta 1215 and the
English Bill of Rights 1689.
6 Paul Gordon Lauren, Oxford Encyclopaedia of Human Rights, ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)
under the topic “History of Human Rights”. Also see: J D van der Vyver, "The Concept of Human Rights:
Its History, Contents and Meaning" (1979) 1979 Acta Juridica 10. Van der Vyver credits John Locke with
“the first theoretical design of human rights” and sees his efforts “to define and to justify the so-called natural
rights of man… as a direct outcome of the seventeenth-century constitutional crises in England surrounding
the despotic rule of the Stuart kings.” Van der Vyver goes on to note that “in its historical context, the doctrine
of human rights was therefore intimately related to the problem of excessive governmental powers.”
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especially if a particular religion is the established religion of a state. For example, Sri Lanka
has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child but child monks are ordained at a
very young age and kept in monasteries that are not comparable to homes.7 Sexual abuse
at monasteries are described as “rampant”.8 In these circumstances is Sri Lanka is fulfilling
its obligations under the CRC by enabling child ordination? Is Sri Lanka’s duty to “foster”
and “protect” Buddhism interfering with its obligations arising under human rights
provisions?
While some religious states have managed to balance and mediate tensions between the
demands of a preferred or endorsed religion and duties arising under human rights
provisions, there are other states which cannot or will not do so. The latter category of
states contain in both their constitution and politics a conflict of priorities that urgently
needs resolution. In states that have not found a balance, the scales have tipped in favour
of the interest of the majority religion and has produced state sponsored oppressive action
against minorities and in some states, genocide. It must be noted that the existence of a
secular constitution, or the lack of an official state religion does not preclude violence
against religious minorities. However, an analysis of reasons for such violence in secular
states lie outside the scope of this research.

7

CRC, (2017), online: Childwomenmingovlk <http://www.childwomenmin.gov.lk/si/ institutes/dep-probationand-child-care-services/child-rights/crc> :The website of the Ministry of Women and Child Affairs of Sri Lanka
states that Sri Lanka ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 on the 12th of July 1991.
8 Saroj, Pathirana. “Sri Lanka's hidden scourge of religious child abuse”, (1 June 2012), online: BBC
News<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-15507304>
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Literature Review
While some countries appear to manage the state-religion relationship with minimum fuss,
in other states the state-religion relationship fuels anger and violence. What is it that
separates the former from the latter? Is there a common thread connecting these
problematic nations? According to the literature, the debate regarding the role of religion
and God in matters of law and the state is rooted in a conflict between two main theories
of law: (i) that God and religion are a necessary part of the development of the law and its
legitimacy (for example, the Aquinian natural law theory that saw God as the penultimate
source of law); and (ii) that laws are a thing produced by humankind alone (for example,
the Austinian conception of law as commands of the sovereign).9 Even though on the
surface it looks like the literature treats law and morality are separate entities there are those
who believe that laws should be moral, for example, Austin, Hart and Raz.
The bulk of academic debate in general regarding the establishment of a state religion
surrounds the “free exercise clause” and the “establishment clause” in the USA.10 Michael
W. McConnell discussing the history of the free exercise clause, observes that in the US
context “more often, the church and the state were independent powers, supported by

9

See Thomas A. Cowan, “Law without Force” (1971) 59:3 California Law Review 683 at 687: “…natural law
theorists admit that any law that is not in accordance with the will of God or of right reason is not law at all;
therefore an immoral positive law is not law… Legal positivism and analytical jurisprudence emphatically
deny to natural law the quality of being law-lawyer's law. These jurisprudential systems hold natural law to
be part of religion or of morality, but not part of legal law. This radical secularization of law completes its
emancipation from religion, erecting a wall of separation that legal positivism and analytical jurisprudence
mean to preserve intact.”
10 Ira C Lupu, "Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion" (1989) 102:5
Harvard Law Review. Lupu notes that Constitution of the United States of America. amendment I states that
"Congress shall make no law.., prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”
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different claims of authority, acting in varying degrees antagonistically or cooperatively one
with the other.”11 The view that religious beliefs and human rights (the product of the
liberal democratic state) are independent of each other is also observable in Asian states.
Knut Aspland seemingly elaborates this dichotomy by noting that in Indonesia human
rights “often tend to be portrayed and perceived in such a manner that they appear as a
quasi-religion or an alternative belief system” and that “human rights emerge as a
competitor challenging existing belief systems, ideologies and religions.” 12 It appears that
legally and politically, religion and the state (along with their founding ideologies) as entities
are separable institutions that possess their own ideologies and tools to maintain power.
Interestingly George Letsas argues that religion is irrelevant to law and uses Dworkin’s
argument to show that religion is derived from the concept of ethical independence, which
is considered by Dworkin to be the “true moral right”.13
According to Ahdar and Leigh, “the prevailing view” towards establishing a state religion
is that it is “unfair.”14 Similarly, Temperman argues that
the absence of a considerable degree of state neutrality has a detrimental effect
on human rights compliance. Under states which identify themselves strongly
with a single religious denomination as well as under states which identify
themselves negatively in relation to religion, there is no scope for human rights
compliance.15
11

Michael W McConnell, "The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion" (1990)
103:7 Harvard Law Review at 1513.
12 Knut D Asplund, "Resistance to Human Rights in Indonesia: Asian Values and beyond" (2009) 10:1 Asia
Pac J HR & L 27 at 28.
13 George Letsas, "The Irrelevance of Religion to Law" in Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon, ed, Religion in
Liberal Political Philosophy, ed (Oxford University Press, 2017) 46.
14 Rex J Ahdar & Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State , ed (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009)
127.
15 Jeroen Temperman, "The Neutral State: Optional or Necessary?: A Triangular Analysis of State–Religion
Relationships, Democratisation and Human Rights Compliance" (2006) 1:3 Religion & Human Rights at 269.

8

Durham shares a similar sentiment, observing that “…both strong positive and strong
negative identification of church and state correlate with low levels of religious freedom. In
both situations, the state adopts a sharply defined attitude toward one or more religions,
leaving little room for dissenting views.”16
Many academics like Durham, Temperman, Brugger, note that state-religion relationships
rather than being a dichotomy between the secular or non-secular occur along a continuum
(Durham), a spectrum (Temperman) or fit into one of a number of models or types
(Partsch, Brugger).17 Partsch recognizes that
mainly four types of relationships between the state and religious communities:
states where the civic community and religious community are identical and
law is based on and reflects religious beliefs; states where the state and religious
community are formally separated but where one creed dominates the public
philosophy; states where the population belongs to more than one religion or
confession (and some to none at all), and religious freedom is fully recognized
with the separation of state and religion a reality; states where atheism is the
official policy but religion is more or less tolerated.18
Brugger, according to Nieuwenhuis, classifies state-religion relationships into six models: in
the first model “the state is completely opposed to religion”, the second “is characterized
by a “wall of separation” taken seriously not only in theory but in practice as well. Barring
all religious signs from public education belongs here”, in the third the “government may
neither advance nor obstruct religion”, the fourth “combines separation with some kind of

16

Cole Durham, "Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework" in Johann Van der Vyver
& John Witte, ed, Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective, ed (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996) at
18.
17 Temperman, supra note 6 at 273. Durham, supra note 7 at 12.
18 Partsch, Karl Josef. “Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms” in Louis Henkin,
ed, The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights , ed (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1981) 209.
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cooperation”, the fifth is “characterized by a more formal unity of state and church in the
form of an established church”, and the in the sixth “state and church actually converge in
a theocracy”.19
It is fairly easy to identify states at the extreme ends of the state-religion spectrum as
theocratic states or secular states. In the literature, states that identify fully with a religion
are usually referred to as theocracies, states that do not constitutionally identify with a
religion are usually referred to as “secular”. Yet, there appears to be no uniformity in the
way states that fall in between the two extremes of the spectrum of state-religion
relationships are defined or the way in which the boundaries of in-between states are
delineated. The Pew Research Centre refers to these in-between states as states that possess
a “preferred or favored religion”. 20 For Durham, between “positive identification” and
“negative identification” lie “some identification between church and state” and “separation
of church and state”. Temperman refers to these in-between states as “virtual coincidence”,
“preferential treatment”, “supported church or religion”, “joint ventures”, “regimes of

19

A. J. Nieuwenhuis, “State and religion, a multidimensional relationship: Some comparative law remarks”
(2012) 10:1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 153 at 155-156. I have relied in Nieuwenhuis’s
translation/ interpretation of Brugger since Brugger’s original work is in German: Winfried Brugger, Von
Feindschaft über Anerkennung zur Identifikation. Staat-Kirche-Modelle und ihr Verhältnis zur
Religionsfreiheit [From antagonism via recognition to identification], in Säkularisierungunddie Weltreligionen
[Secularization and world religions] 257 (Hans Joas & Klaus Wiegand eds., 2007).
20 Pew Research Center. Many countries favor specific religions, officially or unofficially (Pew Research
Center, 2017) <https://www.pewforum.org/2017/10/03/many-countries-favor-specific-religions-officially-orunofficially/pf_10-04-17_statereligions-02/>.
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tolerance” “regimes of indifference”, and “regimes of separation”.21 Adhar and Leigh refer
to in-between states as a whole, referring to these states as “hybrid models”.22
According to the UN Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 22,
the fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion or that it is established
as official or traditional or that its followers comprise the majority of a
population, shall not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any rights
under Covenant, including articles 18 and 27, nor in any discrimination against
adherents to other religions or non-believers. In particular, certain measures
discriminating against the latter, such as measures restricting eligibility for
government service to members of the predominant religion or giving
economic privileges to them or imposing special restrictions on the practice of
other faiths, are not in accordance with the prohibition of discrimination based
on religion or belief and the guarantee of equal protection under article 26. 23
This paragraph is a useful indicator of the perspective of the United Nations regarding the
harms that could befall those belonging to minority religious communities. Paragraph 9
also sets out the position of the UN regarding a possible conflict between a state’s
obligations to a state religion (or endorsed religion or preferred religion) and its human
rights obligations.
Running parallel to discussions regarding secularism and the degrees of separation between
the state and religious institutions are analyses of what it means for states to be “neutral”

21

Jeroen Temperman. “The Right to Neutral Governance, Religion, the State & the Question of Human
Rights Compliance” (2017) 12:24 The Journal of Human Rights 17 at 21.
22 Rex J Ahdar & Ian Leigh. Religious Freedom in the Liberal State , ed (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009)
at 68: “Between the extremes lie various intermediate or hybrid models where religion and state cooperate
together.” See page 69 for a useful table laying out the differences in structure, beliefs, legal stance and
regulation between models that unify religion and state, models that separate the two, and hybrid models.
23 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience
and Religion (Art.18) U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (1993) at paragraph 9.
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towards religions and whether it is an ideal worth aspiring to.24 Katz, in one of the earliest
analyses of the concept of “state neutrality” in 1953 observes that the Establishment Clause
of the United States’ Constitution requires not only neutrality between religious groups, but
also neutrality between "religious believers and non-believers."”25 Galeotti observes that the
term state neutrality is fairly new.26 Much of the literature discusses what neutrality means
in application and as a standard, and identifies types of neutrality.27 Discussions regarding
state policies on accommodations afforded to religion are also common. Micah
Schwartzman attempts to answer the question of “what if religion is not special?” by
classifying state attitudes to the free exercise of religion based on two key ideas:

accommodation and nonaccommodation.

28

According to Schwartzman, “inclusive

accommodation and exclusive nonaccommodation both take inconsistent positions on
whether religion is special. Inclusive accommodation says that religion is special for
purposes of accommodation but not for purposes of justifying the law. Exclusive
nonaccommodation takes exactly the reverse positions”.29 Schwatzeman notes that “those

24

Douglas Laycock, "Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality toward Religion" (1990)
39:4 DePaul L Rev 993.
25 Wilber G Katz, "Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality" (1953) 20:3 U Chicago LRev 426.
26 Anna E. Galeotti. Toleration as Recognition, ed (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at
26.
27 Douglas Laycock, "Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality toward Religion" (1990)
39:4 DePaul L Rev 993. Ronan Mccrea. “Rights as a basis for the religious neutrality of the state: Lessons from
Europe for American defenders of non-establishment” (2016) 14:4 International Journal of Constitutional Law
1009. Javier Martinez-Torron, "Institutional Religious Symbols, State Neutrality and Protection of Minorities
in Europe" [2013] 171 L & Justice - The Christian L Rev 21. Levine, Samuel J. “Review Essay: The Challenges
of Religious Neutrality” (1996) XIII Journal of Law and Religion 531.
28 Micah Schwartzman. “What If Religion Is Not Special?” (2012) 79 The University of Chicago Law Review
1351. Schwartzman analyzes the question by examining American jurisprudence on the Establishment clause
and the Free Exercise Clause. Schwartzman uses “secular purpose” here to refer to legal doctrine and secular
legal thought.
29 Schwartzman, supra note 28 at 1377.

12

tensions [created by inconsistent positions on whether religion is special] can be resolved
only by moving in the direction of either of the remaining two theories—exclusive
accommodation or inclusive nonaccommodation, which treat religion as special for all
purposes or for none, respectively.” 30

These attitudes, Schwartzman observes, are

contingent on whether the state considers claims made on religious grounds worthy of
special considerations and/ or exemptions.
The “in-between status” of states such as Sri Lanka are the result of –among other things –
its colonial history. Julian Go observes that since World War II as “[w]estern empires
crumbled… a multitude of nascent states [sought] to institute a new constitutional order.”31
Go writes that “[i]n 1910 there were 56 independent countries in the world. By 1970, after
the first major wave of decolonization, the number had increased to 142”. Ivo D. Duchacek
writing in 1979 observes that “[o]ver two thirds of the [world’s] existing national
constitutions were drafted and promulgated in the last three decades.” 32 As such it is
necessary to examine literature on post-colonialism that seeks to dissect the effects of
colonialism on a subjugated people and its after-effects.
Several diverse writers from states that were subjected to imperial rule have developed
influential theories of the effects of post-colonialism on people, cultures and identity within
a colonised state. The most dominant among these are creative writers such as Chinua

30

Ibid.
Julian Go. “Modeling the State: Postcolonial Constitutions in Asia and Africa” (2002) 39:4 Southeast Asian
Studies 558.
32 Quoted in Julian Go. “Modeling the State: Postcolonial Constitutions in Asia and Africa” (2002) 39:4
Southeast Asian Studies 558.
31
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Achebe, and Rabindranth Tagore and more academic writers such Homi Bhabha, Aimé
Césaire, Frantz Fanon, Edward Saïd, and Gayatri Spivak. This diversity of form and
background is important given that as, stated by Ashfort, Griffiths and Tiffin, “a crucial
insistence of post-colonial theory is that, despite a shared experience of colonialism, the
cultural realities of postcolonial societies may differ vastly.”33 Post-colonial theories attempt
to provide a possible explanation of the difficulties of states in finding a harmony between
the imposition of a foreign culture upon their own.
One of Homi Bhabha’s most recognized contributions to post-colonial theory is his theory
of “cultural hybridity”. According to Bhabha “hybridity results from various forms of
colonization, which lead to cultural collisions and interchanges.”34 Bhabha writes that “[t]he
trace of what is disavowed is not repressed but repeated as something different – a mutation,
a hybrid.”35 Gayatri Spivak, among her other theories, developed the idea of “strategic
essentialism” which described how different minority communities and groups which
would not normally work with each other would do so strategically to further a common
interest. According to Spivak these groups would come to a temporary “essentialist”
position that allowed the groups to work together. Spivak describes strategic essentialism
as a political tool that allowed minorities to fight together against imperial powers.36 For
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Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths & Helen Tiffin, eds. “Introduction: Universality and Difference” in The Post-

colonial Studies Reader, ed (London: Routledge, 2003) 55.
34

Summarised by Juniper Ellis in Juniper Ellis. “Book Review: The Location of Culture”. (1995) 19:1
Philosophy and Literature 196.
35 Homi Bhabha et al. “Signs Taken for Wonders” in The Post-colonial Studies Reader, 2d ed (London:
Routledge, 2003). Juniper Ellis. “Book Review: The Location of Culture”. (1995) 19:1 Philosophy and
Literature 196.
36 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths & Helen Tiffin. Post-colonial studies: the key concepts, 2nd ed (Hoboken,
NJ: Taylor & Francis, 2007) at 17.
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example in the Sri Lankan context, Anagarika Dharmapala (a 20th century Sinhala
Revivalist) successfully advocated for the unification of disparate communities under the
banner of a national Sinhala-Buddhist identity. 37 Harshana Rambukwalla observes that
“Dharmapala repeatedly warns that Sinhala identity is threatened with dissolution” and
quotes Dharmapala saying: “[t]hink that you are now surrounded by a host of enemies who
encompaseth [sic] your destruction, who is trying to make you a slave in your own land by
giving you to drink the poison of alcohol”.38
Fanon and Saïd writing on nationalism in the post-colonial context (termed “critical
nationalism”) have observed that nationalism is “formed in an awareness that pre-colonial
societies were never simple or homogeneous and that they contained socially prejudicial
class and gender formations that stood in need of reform by a radical force.”39 Saïd, writing
of Fanon’s notion of nationalism states that “[Fanon’s] notion was that unless national
consciousness at its moment of success was somehow changed into social consciousness,
the future would not hold liberation but an extension of imperialism.”40 Fanon also warned
that “in the construction

modern post-colonial state” new national leaders in the

“passionate search for a national culture which existed before the colonial era finds its

37 H

L. Seneviratne Buddhism, Identity and Conflict, ed (Colombo: ICES Auditorium, 2002) 13. H. L
Seneviratne credits Anagarika Dharmapala made several speeches campaigning for a national SinhalaBuddhist identity.
38 Harshana Rambukwella. “Anagarika Dharmapala: the nation and its place in the world” in Politics and
Poetics of Authenticity: A Cultural Genealogy of Sinhala Nationalism, ed (London: UCL Press, 2018).
Rambukwella quotes from Anagarika Dharmapala & Ananda Weihena Palliya Guruge. Return to
righteousness a collection of speeches, essays and letters of the Anagarika Dharmapala , ed (Colombo:
Ministry of Cultural Affairs & Information, Ministry of Socio - Cultural Integration, Dep. of Cultural Affairs,
1991) at 510. Here Dharmapala was referring to British colonizers.
39 Ashcroft et al, supra note 34 at 91.
40 Ashcroft et al., supra note 34 at 92.
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legitimate reason in the anxiety shared by many indigenous intellectuals to shrink away
from that western culture in which they all risk being swamped” and to “renew contact
once more with the oldest and most pre-colonial springs of their people” would mythologize
their past and use it to “create the new elite power groups, masquerading as the liberators
of whom he had warned.”41 Fanon’s warning is uncannily accurate in the context of Sri
Lanka (given that he is drawing from his experience in post-colonial Algeria) in that this is
exactly what took place during the formation of the state of Sri Lanka. 42 Post-colonial
analyses such as these, while they examine the consequences of colonialism, focus largely
upon the culture of a nation and its effect upon its people. New analyses have emerged
applying the spirit of these post-colonial theories and analyses to the legal sphere, including
legal principles and concepts such as human rights and legal institutions.
Sally Engle Merry writing about law and colonialism notes that colonialism involved the
large-scale transfer of laws and legal institutions from one society to another which resulted
in a dual legal system (a phantom of which is seen in Sri Lanka’s personal law system).43
Merry observes however, that colonialism involved not only a transfer one of laws and legal
society to another but an attempt to rule and transformation a society by another.44 Merry
argues that instances where “cases are handled by police or courts are particularly
important in introducing the culture of a dominant group. These moments can be analzyed

41

Ashcroft et al., note 33 at 92.
Ashcroft et al., note 33 at 92. Also see below “The Roots: A History of Conflict” and “Promises to the Past,
Promises to the Future: A Conflict in the Constitution”, particularly sections regarding the influence of the
mythological Mahavansa chronicle in Sri Lankan nationalist sentiment.
43 Sally Engle Merry, "Law and Colonialism" (1991) 25:4 Law & Soc'y Rev 889 at 890.
44 Ibid.
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(sic) as cultural performances, events that produce transformations in sociocultural practices
and in consciousness.”45 Merry posits that “law, along with other institutions of the colonial
state, transformed conceptions of time, space, property, work, marriage, and the state. The
role law played in the colonizing process is an instance of its capacity to reshape culture
and consciousness.”46 Academics such as Binder developed this stream of thought further
to draw a relationship between imperialism, the nation-state and cultural relativism.
According to Binder, “the nation-state ideal is rarely fulfilled in the post-colonial world.”
Binder notes that what the West refers to as “developing states” are states that have not yet
developed into nation-states but are “states only superficially attached to political societies
that had not yet developed a high level of national integration, mobilization and
participation.”47 Importantly, Binder observes that
the state is often just one cultural structure among many in the developing
world, rather than the center from which a national culture radiates. Indeed,
there may be no national culture as such. Instead there may be disparate
cultural structures, some local and some international.48
Binder, like Merry and the post-colonialist thinkers, essentially draws a causal relationship
between colonialism and the discomfort post-colonial states feel in what seems like
borrowed garb. These thinkers analyse the difficulties of finding a balance between a precolonial history and roots, colonial laws and processes, and post-colonial identity formation.
However, these writers analyse the effect of post-colonialism on a culture and its people

45

Merry, supra note 41 at 892.
Ibid.
47 Guyora Binder. “Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law” (1999) 5 Buffalo
Human Rights Law Review 211 at 219.
48 Binder, supra note 47 at 220.
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but do not analyse the manifestations of this tension through the subject of religion in postcolonial constitutions. This thesis analyses how the constitution of Sri Lanka attempts to
maintain its cultural identity while also trying to live up to modern human rights standards.
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Chapter 2
Sri Lanka: The Birth of a Religious State
It appears that the combination of Sri Lanka’s colonial history with its mish-mash of colonial
legal sources, majority-minority dynamics in the country, the ratio and composition of
communities, and unresolved communal grievances has given rise to a proclivity to
communal violence in modern times. This is evidenced by a thirty year long civil war, and
the incidence of communal violence following the war.1 The factors that feed Sri Lanka’s
proclivity to communal violence can be categorised into the following four broad areas: (i)
Sri Lanka’s historical roots in Buddhism and a resulting belief that Sri Lanka is a “Buddhist
State”; (ii) a fusion of ethnicity, language and religion to create composite identities; (iii) the
heritage of colonial politics. Below we see how these same factors also led to and continues
to sustain Sri Lanka’s relationship with Buddhism.

The Roots: Giving Buddhism Foremost Place
Sri Lanka’s ethno-religious conflict is rooted in the debate over which race first occupied
the land now known as “Sri Lanka”.2 Each side has attempted to argue that their ancestors

1

By “colonial legal sources” I mean how the laws of colonial powers are still the residual law of Sri Lanka.
For example, Roman-Dutch law is the residual law of Sri Lanka for matters regarding property, family law,
and delicts. British law of contracts is the law to which Sri Lankan courts refer to when there is a lacuna in
the domestic contract law. Similarly, British law applies to matters regarding commercial law, law relating to
criminal and civil procedure, the law of evidence and administrative law.
2 See Part I, Chapter I, particularly pages 3-17 of K M De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, ed (London: C.
Hurst, 1981) for a full history of settlement and colonisation in ancient Sri Lanka. Jonathan Spencer,
"Introduction: The Power of the Past" in Jonathan Spencer, ed, Sri Lanka : History and the Roots of Conflict,
1st ed (Routledge, 1990).
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(Sinhalese: Aryans, Tamils: Dravidians) occupied and/or united the country first.3 These
divisive ethno-religious identities were formulated by nationalists within each community
and were revived with a vengeance as a response to colonialism and colonial policies.
These competing claims to territory have been tied to efforts to gain political power and
establish a right to rule by both the Sinhalese and the Tamils. In the periphery of this jostle
for power are other ethnicities, such as the Veddhas, Moors, Burghers, Malays, Chetties,
and Kaffirs, and those belonging to other religions such as Islam and Christianity. This
conflict became more pronounced when Sri Lanka was subjected to colonial rule. Sri Lanka
has been under the rule of three colonial powers: the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the British.

The Arrival of Buddhism in Sri Lanka

Figure 1. A depiction of Sanghamitta Theraniya bringing the Sri Maha Bodhi tree sapling to Sri Lanka, at
the Kelaniya Temple in Sri Lanka.4

Buddhism arrived in Sri Lanka around the 3rd Century BCE. The Indian Emperor Ashoka
(304 BCE -- 232 BCE) having “[taken] the Mauryan Empire to its greatest geographical

3
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extent and its full height of power” and having laid waste to many lives, turned penitent.5
Ashoka turned to Buddhism as a means to expiate his guilt and sought to spread the word
of Buddha to others. As part of this mission, he sent his son Arahath Mahinda to Sri Lanka
to meet the reigning king Devanampiya Tissa to covert him to Buddhism. 6 Mahinda
preached to Tissa who subsequently became a disciple of Buddha and adopted Buddhism
as the official religion of the kingdom.
It became a kind of “king’s duty” from there onwards to ensure the survival of Buddhism
in Sri Lanka, to preserve relics of religious importance, and to build temples and
monasteries.7 Some examples of this can be seen to this day; the Sacred Sri Maha Bodhi
tree in Anuradhapura, the ancient city of Anuradhapura contains the Abayagiri stupa that
was built by King Valagamba, the construction of Ruwanweliseya by King Dutugemunu,
and Jetavanaramaya and its monastery built by King Mahasena. Sri Lanka was also ruled
from time to time by Tamil kings and invaders from India such as King Elara (204 BCE to
164 BCE), who interrupted the rule of Sinhalese Kings, was in power for 44 years, and
subsequently earned a reputation for being fair and just.8

5

Kristin
B
Rattini.
“Ashoka”,
(14
June
2019),
National
Geographic
online: <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/people/reference/ashoka/>
6 De Silva note 2 at 11. K. M De Silva also observes at page 41 that “Brahmanism was the religion of the
ruling elite groups before the conversion of Devanampiya Tissa to Buddhism changed the situation. Despite
the rapidity with which the new religion spread in the island in the next few centuries, and despite its status
as the official religion, the tolerant atmosphere of a Buddhist society ensured the survival of Hinduism with
only a marginal loss of influence. Brahmans retained much of their traditional importance in society both on
account of their learning and their near monopoly over domestic religious practices.”
7 De Silva, supra note 2 at 46: “…pious kings regarded it a sacred duty to divert part of the resources and
revenues at their command for the maintenance of the sangha.”
8 De Silva, supra note 2 at 12.
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King Elara was deposed as king after a fifteen-year campaign by Dutugemunu that came
to a head in a duel between the former and the latter. K.M De Silva observes that this duel
“is dramatised as the central theme of the later chapters of the Mahavamsa as an epochmaking confrontation between the Sinhalese and Tamils, and extolled as a holy war fought
in the interests of Buddhism.”9 However, K. M. De Silva notes that
“there were in fact large reserves of support for [Elara] among the Sinhalese,
and [Dutugemunu]…had to face the resistance of other Sinhalese rivals who
appear to have been more apprehensive of his political ambitions than they
were concerned about [Elara]’s continued domination…”10
According to Gananath Obeysekere,
Tamils were also historically allies of the Sinhalas; Sinhala kings sought the aid
of Tamil kings in their local conflicts. Some kings fled to India to seek the aid
of their Tamil allies while others cemented alliances by marrying Tamil queens.
But there was no consistency in this latter project either. In some periods in
history the popular imagination records that the offspring of Tamil queens were
illegitimate or inferior to Sinhala ones; this is reversed at other times. These
marriage alliances were not only a historical reality for both commoners and
kings but they also refract back into the foundational myth giving legitimacy to
intermarriages for, according to that myth’s proclamation, the union of Vijaya
and his followers with the Tamils from Madurapura produced the Sinhalas.
Thus Sinhalas have Tamil blood, since “blood” is bilaterally inherited in
Sinhala genetic theory.11
Deepika Udagama observes that the ethno- religious typology that exists in Sri Lanka
appears to be a construct of the historical mythology surrounding the formation of the
nation. This instance in the Mahavansa is perhaps the beginning, or at least one of the
earliest attempts by nationalist chroniclers to fuse ethnicity and religion (Sinhalese with

9

De Silva, note 2 at page 15.
Ibid.
11 Gananath Obeyesekere. “Buddhism, ethnicity, and identity: a problem in Buddhist history” in Deegalle
Mahinda, ed, Buddhism, conflict and violence in modern Sri Lanka, ed (London: Routledge, Taylor &
Francis Group, 2006) 156-157
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Buddhism, Tamil with Hindu) to form a singular identity in Sri Lanka. Udagama explains
that
The Mahavansa, the historical chronicle of the country, has been central to the
idea that Lanka is the land of the Sinhalese who were chosen by the Buddha
as guardians of Buddhism. The chronicle, written over many centuries by
Buddhist monks, appears to have had the promotion of that idea at its core
agenda and mission. Although viewed with scepticism by historians and
anthropologists as an elaborately embellished and romanticized construction
of historical events to promote a self-serving goal of its writers, this central thesis
of the Mahavansa has had a powerful influence in shaping the self-identity of
the majority of the Sinhala community.12
The Mahavansa’s account of the birth and proliferation of Buddhism remains relevant and
important today because of the role the Mahavansa plays as source material and
justification for Sinhala Buddhist nationalists and extremists.13
Discussions regarding the place of Buddhism and religion within the land now known as
Sri Lanka are as old as the earliest texts documenting life in Sri Lanka dating to 400 BCE
– 300 BCE. Chief among these is the Mahavansa (translating into “the Great Chronicle”).
Gombrich notes that the Mahavansa was “written in Pali by Buddhist monks in several
instalments over the centuries… regards the Sinhalese people as the rightful owners and
rulers of the entire island of Sri Lanka, and identifies their fortunes with the fortunes of
Theravada Buddhism.”14 A.J. Wilson points out that the translation of the Mahavansa by
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Deepika Udagama, et al. “The Democratic State and Religious Pluralism: Comparative Constitutionalism
and Constitutional Experiences of Sri Lanka” in Comparative Constitutionalism in South Asia, ed (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013) 157.
13 Bruno Marshall Shirley, Violence, Identity, and Alterity | Post-War Rhetoric of Sri Lanka’s Bodu Bala
Sena (Master of Arts in Religious Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 2015)
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14 Richard Gombrich. “Is The Sri Lankan War A Buddhist Fundamentalism?” in Buddhism, conflict and
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Wilheim Geiger and its subsequent English translation coincides with the initiation of the
Sinhala nationalist Temperance movement and the nationalism of Sinhala Buddhist
monks.15

The Fusion of Ethnicity, Language and Religion

Figure 2. A graphic appearing in an English language National newspaper celebrating the birth anniversary
of Anagarika Dharmapala “Sinhala Buddhist…. par excellence”.16

According to the 2011 Census of Sri Lanka approximately 70 per cent of the 20.35 million
Sri Lankans are Buddhist, 12.6 per cent Hindu, 9.7 per cent Muslim (mainly Sunnis) 6.2
per cent are Roman Catholic, and 1.4 percent are other Christians.17 An important feature
of the conflict in Sri Lanka is the modern fusion of ethnicity, language and religion to create
composite communal identities. It is these composite communal identities that are in
modern times at odds with each other. Buddhism is usually practiced by Sinhalese;
Hinduism by Tamils and Sinhalese; Christianity by Sinhalese, Tamil, and Burghers; and
Islam by Moors and Malays. As a result, Sinhala identity is popularly linked with Buddhist
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identity, and Tamil identity is linked with Hindu identity. Moor and Malay identity with
Islam, Burgher identity with Christianity.18 However in reality, while most Sinhalese are
Buddhists, a modest percentage of Sinhalese are followers of Hinduism or Christianity,
while a modest percentage of Tamils are followers of Buddhism or Christianity, and a small
percentage of Sinhalese are followers of Islam.19 The language of the Sinhalese is Sinhala,
the language of the Tamils is Tamil, the language of Sri Lankan Muslims is generally Tamil.
The language of Burghers is English. English is spoken as a “link language”. Therefore, an
attack against one of these elements (ethnicity, language, religion) is perceived as an attack
on all three groups. For example, Sri Lanka’s Sinhala Only Act of 1956 which made Sinhala
the only official language of the state is widely considered to be a trigger point for Tamil
demands for a separate state.
In these circumstances in the interest of securing the best possibility of a peaceful future for
Sri Lanka (and states like it), it is imperative that any murkiness and incoherence in the
way the relationships between religion and human rights are set out in the constitution is
clarified. This is necessary to protect a community, as J. S. Mill describes both from
“innumerable vultures” and “minor harpies” who wish to prey upon the community and
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See works by Gananath Obeyesekere for a comprehensive analysis of how Sinhalese identity was fused
with Buddhist identity. Berkwitz succinctly summarizes Obeyesekere: “Buddhist historical narratives from
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73 at 74.
19 Deepika Udagama, "The Democratic State and Religious Pluralism | Comparative Constitutionalism and
Constitutional Experiences of Sri Lanka" in Sunil Khilnani, Vikram Raghavan & Arun K Thiruvengadam,
ed, Comparative Constitutionalism in South Asia, 1st ed (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2016) at 157.
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“the king of the vultures” tasked with protecting the community. 20 It is of paramount
importance that the rights and liberties of citizens should be protected and defended
vigorously, against any institution that threatens those rights and liberties, including the
institution that ensures that the promised rights are granted. However, as we see below,
attempts to satisfy rival strains of communalism has resulted in a confused constitution.

Promises to the Past, Promises to the Future: A Conflict in the Constitution
The conflict within Sri Lanka’s constitution stems from the constitutional duties to
Buddhism (as set out in Article 9 of the Constitution) and fundamental rights (such as the
right to equality and freedom from discriminations). Although the conflict between these
provisions does not appear obvious upon first reading, as will be seen below (especially in
Chapter 3), the conflicts between these constitutional provisions and the values they
espouse has led to the infringement of the fundamental rights of groups such as minorities,
child monks, and women. Incoherent constitutional provisions of the kind analysed in this
thesis are the result of a combination of factors such as a tumultuous political history,
identity politics, and communalism. In this context a combination of unresolved historical
grievances by communities against each other, a lack of trust in legal mechanisms to
address these grievances, discrimination (real or perceived), and the inflammation of
communal sentiment by religious leaders also lead to the proliferation of communal
violence. 21 When and where did these incoherent constitutional provisions originate?
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Since independence Sri Lanka has enacted three constitutions: the Constitution of Ceylon
1948, the First Republican Constitution of 1972, and the Second Republican Constitution
of 1978. The constitution currently in effect is the Second Republican Constitution of
1978.22 The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 1978 possesses
nineteen amendments to date.23 Sri Lanka’s two autochthonous constitutions (the first in
1972 and the second in 1978) were created in the backdrop of inter-communal jostling for
representation. While Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict can be traced to pre-colonial times (as seen
above), conflicts between various ethnic and religious communities were exacerbated by
colonial politics, policies, and law. Sri Lanka has been the subject of three colonial powers:
first, the Portuguese (1597 – 1658), second, the Dutch (1640 – 1796), and finally, the British
(1815 – 1948). After the occupation of Holland by France, in 1796, the Dutch settlements
were taken over by the British, and administered by the British East India Company until
the conquest of Kandy by the British. The only colonial power to control the entire island
of Sri Lanka were the British, who captured the Kandyan kingdom (that had thus far
managed to fend off colonial invaders) in 1815 in the Second Kandyan War.24 The most
visible representation of this conflict can be observed in the changing quotas for communal
representation through subsequent colonial constitutions.

policy where the state took over state-aided private school which were run by Christian groups. According
to K. M De Silva, De Silva, note 48 at 528: “Thus the Buddhist agitation for state control achieved its objective
under Mrs Bandaranaike's S.L.F.P. government, but at great cost to the country in terms of the bitterness and
tension it generated between the Buddhists and the powerful Roman Catholic minority. The Roman
Catholics, like the Tamils, smouldered with resentment.”
22 The Constitution of Ceylon 1948 is also known as “the Soulbury Constitution of 1948” after its architect
Lord Soulbury.
23 Hereinafter referred to as “the 1978 Constitution of Sri Lanka”.
24 K M De Silva, note 2 at 229.
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J. A. L. Cooray lays out in detail the constitutional journey beginning with the 1802
Constitution wherein “[t]he British settlements in the Island were confirmed under the
Treaty of Amiens as part of the British dominions.”25 On June 4th, 1806 Sri Lanka (then
Ceylon) saw the birth of the first ancestor of the freedom of religion in Sri Lanka in a
Proclamation made by Governor North that “recognised liberty of conscience and free
exercise of religious worship to everyone.” 26 Writing of the administrative and judicial
systems put in place by the 1802 Constitution, J. A. L. Cooray observes that “…at this early
stage of British rule though the Government of Britain was prepared to introduce the
principle of the independence of the judiciary, it was not similarly prepared to concede
even a small measure of representative or responsible government.”27 Each measure of
representative and responsible government would be hard won over the course of British
colonial rule and would lay the foundations for Sri Lanka’s modern manifestation of
communal disharmony. For example, the Constitution of 1833 declared that the Legislative
Council would consist of nine official members and six unofficial members. Half of the
unofficial members would consist of Burghers, Sinhalese, and Tamils. After much agitation
under the Constitution of 1910, the Legislative Council consisted of 21 members, with ten
unofficial members, from this number one member each was selected to represent the
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Joseph A L Cooray, Constitutional and Administrative Law of Sri Lanka (Ceylon), ed (Colombo: Sumathi
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Kandyan Sinhalese, Muslims, two each to represent Low Country Sinhalese and Tamils.
This trend of negotiation for communal representatives progressed well into the early 1900s.
According to Cooray, the Donoughmore Commission which was set up to create the
Donoughmore Constitution of 1931 was against the establishment of a Parliamentary
system of government in Sri Lanka (then Ceylon). One of the reasons was a “serious danger
that in the formation of Parties obligations of race and caste would be too insistent to be
ignored.”28
Interestingly, during colonial rule, British administrators acted as the protectors of
Buddhism for about two decades after they landed. The Kandyan Convention of 1815,
which ceded control of the Kandyan kingdom to the British, placed upon the British the
duty to continue the “king’s duty of paying salaries to monks, funding religious celebrations,
and making official acts of appointments to recognize high clerical office.29 Constitutionally,
the latter part of British rule was defined by a series of attempts to determine what exactly
constituted fair and equitable representation between the Sinhalese, the Tamils and other
minorities. The Soulbury Constitution of Sri Lanka was a parting gift by the British upon
Sri Lanka’s independence in 1948. This was the first time a Constitutional document had
explicitly addressed the rights of religious and ethnic minorities. These rights were set out
in s. 29(2) of the Constitution of Ceylon 1948. S. 29 (2) stated that no law passed by
Parliament shall:
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“(a) prohibit or restrict the free exercise of any religion; or
(b) make person of any community or religion liable to disabilities or
restrictions to which persons of other communities or religions are not made
liable; or
(c) confer on persons of any community or religion any privilege or advantage
which is not conferred on persons of other communities or religions, or
(d) alter the constitution of any religious body except with the consent of the
governing authority of that body, so, however, that in any case where a
religious body is incorporated by law, no such alteration shall be made except
at the request of the governing authority of that body”.30
s. 29 (3) declared that laws made in contravention of the above rights were, to the extent
of the contravention, void.31 The most notable feature of the above rights is that they were
negative liberties (i.e. freedom from interference or an absence of obstacles, barriers, or
constraints). It may be argued that these liberties were a gesture of secularism, but not an
outright expression of secularism. Many Buddhist organizations objected to s. 29 (2)
because they argued that it did not redress damage done to Buddhism during
Colonialism.32 Additionally, there were concerns by Tamil leaders that even at the time of
formulation there was a growing ‘“influence of religion on politics” and that the rise of
political parties which were organised along religious and ethnic lines were making “direct
appeals…to arouse communal passions.”’33
Although s. 29 (2) laid new ground to provide protections to minorities, it was unable to
prevent the injustices of the Citizenship Act and the Sinhala Only Act. The Citizenship Act,
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formally known as the Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948 in effect denied citizenship to Tamils
of Indian descent. Under the Sinhala Only Act, formally known as the Official Language
Act No. 33 of 1956, Sinhala – the language of the majority – was made the official language
of the state. This act created immense difficulty for those who were only literate in Tamil
and led to communal violence. According to J. A. L. Cooray the rights laid out in s. 29 (2)
“did not in practice sufficiently fulfil the expectations of the Constitution makers.”34 When
put to the test in numerous cases, s. 29 (2) failed to provide any real protections to
minorities. For example, in Kodakan Pillai v Mudanayake the Privy Council held that the
amendments and laws “constituted legislation on citizenship and could not be said to be
making persons of the Indian Tamil Community liable to a disability to which persons of
other communities were not made liable.”35
It is in this context that the Constitution of 1972 was created. At a press conference held to
announce the coming to being of the Constituent Assembly that would go on to create Sri
Lanka’s first autochthonous constitution, the Minister of Constitutional Affairs declared that
this would be a historic occasion.36 Dr. Colvin R. de Silva noted at the time: “this is not an
attempt…to create a new superstructure on an old foundation. We are setting out on the
task of laying an entirely new foundation for which the people of this country gave us a
mandate…” 37 Additionally, the Prime Minister at the time (and the first female prime
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minister and head of state in the world) Sirimavo Bandaranaike stated in a radio broadcast
that
the Constitution which a nation such as ours gives itself must be adequate for
a twofold task. In a multiracial and multi-religious nation such as ours it has to
be the instrument of the development of the nation itself. It must serve to build
the diversity imposed on it by history. Though there are among us several races
such as Sinhalese, Tamils, Moors, Burghers, Malays and others; and several
religious groups, such as the Buddhists, Hindus, Christians ad Muslims, we are
one nation.38
These statements reveal that in developing its first autochthonous constitution, Sri Lanka
began with good intentions: an intention to start afresh, to aid in the development of the
nation and to build on its diversity. Furthermore, the constitution would be created
according to the mandate of the people.
However, the new constitution saw the birth of the predecessor to Article 9. Article 6 of the
1972 Constitution of Sri Lanka declared that “The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to
Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect
and foster Buddhism while assuring to religions the rights granted by Section 18 (1) (d)”.
According to Joseph A. L. Cooray the manifesto upon which the government won its
mandate stated that “Buddhism, the religion of the majority of the people, will be ensured
its rightful place. The adherents of all faiths will be guaranteed freedom of religious worship
and the right to practice their religion.”39 However, Cooray notes that the words “foremost
place were substituted at a later stage in the drafting of the Constitution”.40 K. M. De Silva

38

Joseph A. L. Cooray, supra note 31 at 61—62.
Joseph A. L. Cooray, supra note 31 at 72.
40 Joseph A. L. Cooray, supra note 31 at 71.
39

32

cites the adoption of the new constitution –especially the provision on religion -- as a pivotal
moment in the reignition of communal tensions in Sri Lanka.41 De Silva posits that with the
implementation of Chapter II of the 1972 Constitution Sri Lanka “ceased to be a secular
state pure and simple, even if it did not become the theocratic state which Buddhist pressure
groups would have liked it to be.”42
In giving reasons for giving Buddhism primacy in the Sri Lankan Constitution, Dr. Colvin
R. de Silva, the Minister of Constitutional Affairs at the time stated that
…Buddhism holds in the history and tradition of Ceylon a special place and
the specialness thereof should be recognised in the Resolution. It was at the
same time desired that it should be stressed that the historical specialness, the
traditional specialness and the contemporary specialness which flows from its
position in the country should not be so incorporated in the Constitution as
in any manner to hurt or invade the susceptibilities of those who follow other
religions in Ceylon or the rights that are due to all who follow other religions
in Ceylon…43
If the “specialness” of Buddhism needed to be acknowledged in the Constitution, the
constitution could have merely recognized the contribution of Buddhism to Sri Lankan
history, tradition, and culture without placing Buddhism at the top of a hierarchy as it does
in Articles 6 of the 1972 Constitution and Article 9 of the 1978 Constitution. This raises the
issue of why a historically dominant religion needs to be given “special” recognition in the
constitution anyway, given that other religions such as Brahminism and Animism predated
the arrival of Buddhism in Sri Lanka and the strong presence of various strands of
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Hinduism and Islam since before the 1500s. A recognition such as this would only serve to
diminish and ignore the contribution and influence of other religions in shaping Sri Lanka.
Such a recognition of the “specialness” of only one religion is at odds with the nature of a
constitution, which is ideally inclusive and representative of its people. Diminishing and
ignoring the role of minority religions in the history of Sri Lanka would only serve to
exclude and alienate minorities.
Additionally, a recognition of the place of Buddhism in Sri Lanka’s history and society is
very different from the constitution decreeing that Buddhism “shall have foremost place”
[emphasis added]: an acknowledgement would be a statement of fact, but Article 6 of 1972
Constitution and Article 9 of the 1978 Constitution are authoritative commands that dictate
that Buddhism should occupy a certain position in the future.44 The Sinhalese version of
Article 9 to the 1978 constitution states: “ශ්රී ලංකා ජනරජය බුද්ධාගමට
ප්රමුඛස්ථානය පිරිනමන්නන්ය.” The verb “පිරිනමන්නන්ය” means to “devote”. A
direct translation would read “Sri Lanka devotes the foremost place to Buddhism.”
Heeding the demands of Buddhist politicians and portions of the public the two subsequent
republican constitutions gave Buddhism foremost place. The two republican constitutions
also included a chapter on Fundamental Human Rights in place of Article 29(2).
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Demystifying Article 9
Entering from the elevator doors onto the floor that houses the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka
– the highest court of the land – a visitor is immediately greeted by a ten-foot-high sprawling
mural of a scene from a Buddhist legend. This may be either gratifying or disturbing
depending on whether one believed Sri Lanka to be a Sinhala-Buddhist state or a secular
state respectively. According to Article 9 of the Sri Lankan Constitution,
“The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and
accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster the Buddha
Sasana while assuring to all religions the rights granted by Article 10 and 14
(1)(e).”45
The phrase “foremost place” is both obvious and murky. The Sinhala version of the
Constitution uses the term “ප්රමුඛස්ථානය” which directly translates to “foremost” and is
paradoxically just as forthright and ambiguous. According to the Oxford English
Dictionary “foremost” is an adverb meaning “before anything else in rank, importance, or
position; in the first place.” 46 Examined in isolation the term “foremost” clearly gives
Buddhism primacy over other religions.
However the chapter on Fundamental Rights of the constitution, particularly Articles 12
(1), 12 (2), and 12 (3) clearly state “[all] persons are equal before the law and are entitled
to the equal protection of the law”, that “[no] citizen shall be discriminated against on the
grounds of race, religion, language, caste, sex, political opinion, place of birth or any one
of such grounds” and that “[no] person shall, on the grounds of race, religion, language,
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caste, sex or any one of such grounds, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or
condition with regard to access to shops, public restaurants, hotels, places of public
entertainment and places of public worship of his own religion.” The phrasing of Article 9
muddies the hierarchy of two competing duties: the duty upon the state to “protect and
foster” Buddhism versus the duty to ensure to all citizens – no matter their religion – “the
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the freedom to have or to adopt a
religion or belief of his choice” (Article 10 of the Constitution of Sri Lanka 1978) and the
duty to ensure to all citizens “the freedom, either by himself or in association with others,
and either in public or in private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice and teaching” (Article 14 (1)(e) of the Constitution of Sri Lanka 1978).
According to Esufally, “Article 9 cannot be read as granting Buddhism ‘the foremost place’
at the expense of the rights afforded to minority groups to practise their beliefs.”47 Esufally
observes that the ‘assurance’ granted under Article 9 that the rights of minorities are
protected under Article 10 and Article 14(1)(e) is absolute and that the protection of
Buddhism “cannot in and of itself limit the scope of Article 14(1)(e).48 However while this
may be one reading of the legal relationship between Article 9 and Articles 10 and 14(1)(e),
in at least one case (the Sisters of the Holy Cross case below) the courts have reduced the
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scope of minority religious rights supposed to be protected under Articles 10 and 14(1)(e)
(i.e. the right to proselytize) because of a threat to the existence of Buddhism in the country.
According to Dr. Deepika Udagama, Dr. Colvin R. De Silva, the Minister of Constitutional
Affairs during the creation of Sri Lanka’s first autochthonous constitution “was vehement
in his denial that Article 6 made Buddhism the State religion.”49 However jurisprudence
around Article 9 (its near identical successor) has cast doubt on Sri Lanka’s supposed status
as a secular state, and shown Article 9 clashing with the rights assured to religious minorities
under Articles 10, 12 (1), 12 (2), 12 (3), and 14 (1) (e).50

Courts and Contradictions
The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has not been generally consistent in its analysis of what
Article 9 really means. Several major cases stand out. The first of these is the case of the

Teaching Sisters of the Holy Cross of the Third Order of Saint Francis in Menzingen of Sri
Lanka (Incorporation) (also known as “the unethical conversion case”).51 Two other cases
–S. C Special Determination No. 2/2001 and S. C. Special Determination 2/2003 – were
also argued along the same lines (and by the same counsel).52This case involved an effort
to incorporate a Catholic religious organization through a private member’s bill. The bill
was challenged under Article 121 challenging the constitutionality of the bill. The bill was
found to be unconstitutional because the proposed objectives of the organization included
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the phrase “spreading the Catholic religion” and an intention to set up schools and
nurseries. The objectives were considered by the Supreme Court to provide “material and
other benefits” and other social advantages to the convert and thereby interfere with the
free exercise of one’s conscience. The judgement in this case interprets Article 9 to mean
that the full religious freedom (religious freedom that includes the freedom to propagate
one’s religion) of minority religions stops short where it begins to impinge on “the very
existence of Buddhism.53 The Court noted, inter alia, that
the petitioner submitted that the effect of Article 9 is to “protect and foster” the
Buddha Sansana whilst assuring to all religions the rights mentioned in Articles
10 and 14 1) (e) of the Constitution. Therefore, the petitioner contended that a
person of other religions could exercise the said right as long as it does not
affect the Buddha sasana. It was also submitted that when an institution is
established to propagate Christianity by providing material and other benefits
and thereby converting such recipients to the said religion, that would affect
the very existence of Buddhism.
As referred to earlier, the Constitution does not recognise a fundamental right
to propagate a religion. The expression “propagate” has a number of
meanings, but according to the shorter Oxford Dictionary it means ‘to spread
from person to person, or from place to place to disseminate, diffuse (a
statement, belief, practise, etc).’54
That same year, a bill sponsored by the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), a political party
which is composed primarily of Buddhist monks, was challenged in the Supreme Court.55
The bill titled the “Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution” sought to make Buddhism
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Sri Lanka’s official religion. However, the Supreme Court ruled the bill unconstitutional,
and noted that the bill would violate the rights of minorities. Esufally observes that
This judgment represents a significant departure from the conservative stance
of the judiciary vis-à-vis the manifestation of an individual’s freedom of religion.
Therefore, it is apparent that a legislative attempt to officially entrench
Buddhism as the state religion is where the Supreme Court is willing to draw
the line.56
The court also professed Sri Lanka to be a secular state, noting that “the essence of being
a secular state, as Sri Lanka is, is the recognition and preservation of different types of
people, with diverse language and different belief, and placing them together so as to form
a whole and united nation.”57 The judicial position that Sri Lanka was a secular state was
seemingly reaffirmed in Ashik v. Bandula and Others, where the Chief Justice at the time
Sarath N. Silva posited: “It has to be firmly borne in mind that Sri Lanka is a secular state.”58
However Chief Justice Silva goes on to undermine this statement by quoting a Buddhist
teaching on learning in silence as one of his justifications for his decision. 59 As Abeyratne
noted: “the Court here draws from the country's majority faith to define the contours of
constitutional religious practice and then imposes that definition on a minority faith.”60
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“Good” Constitutions and Good Governance
Of course, there are no such things as perfect constitutions. Even the very best of
constitutions are fully capable of being warped, amended, being intentionally
misunderstood or misinterpreted to legitimize non-democratic, illiberal ideas and actions.
For example, Hitler used the Enabling Act of 1933 to suspend civil liberties in the Weimar
Constitution and effectively transfer power to himself. Loewenstein observes that “the
preamble of the act [the Enabling Act] contains the explicit statement that the vote on the
statute ‘complied with the requirements of legislation amending the Constitution’” and that
“by a few printed lines in the statute book the government not only monopolized the
regular legislative function but also seized the amending power which the Weimar
constitution had reserved to qualified majorities of both houses of the legislature acting
together with, under certain conditions, the electorate.”61 This example is a warning that
“a few printed lines” can drastically alter the protections afforded to a community. It is the
Sisyphean task of every community to ensure that every provision and law is tested for
weakness and capacity for exploitation, and that loopholes are closed as they appear.
Therefore, it is a fundamental principle of rule of law that laws must be both just and clear.
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Chapter 3
Duties to Human Rights vs. Duties to Religion
In order to assess whether religious freedoms are protected, it is necessary to understand
what duties, obligations and responsibilities fall upon the state in relation to the protection
of the religious freedoms of its people.
The European Court of Human Rights has defined the role of the State vis-à-vis religion
thusly:
The Court has frequently emphasised the State’s role as the neutral and
impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs…this
role is conducive to public order, religious harmony and tolerance in a
democratic society…the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality is
incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of
religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are expressed and that it
requires the State to ensure mutual tolerance between opposing groups.
Accordingly, the role of the authorities in such circumstances is not to remove
the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing
groups tolerate each other.1
It is also important to understand the point of origin of these duties, obligations, and
responsibilities to assess the legal force of those provisions. Human Rights obligations and
duties are bestowed onto states and are also enforced through two primary systems: (i) the
domestic legal system; and (ii) the international legal system. Under the domestic legal
system, state duties regarding human rights are primarily set out in the constitution of a
state, usually in a chapter regarding fundamental human rights. In some states, besides the
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constitution, human rights are set out in a “Human Rights Act” or a “Charter of Rights and
Freedoms” (as in Canada).
The provisions contained in these instruments are buttressed by other constitutional
provisions and laws that set out the ways in which these rights become justiciable. It is
through justiciability that human rights are given their power and force. If laws granting
human rights were not justiciable, these laws would have all the power and force of a “Dish
of the Day” recommendation made by a server in a restaurant. This was an issue faced by
the international community after the implementation of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), which appeared to be resolved when justices of the International
Court of Justice opined that the UDHR was part of customary international law and as a
result, was binding.2 As such the strength and binding factor of a provision relating to
human rights is extremely important. The strongest, most insistent human rights provisions
are found in the constitution of a state. In Sri Lanka, these provisions are found in the
chapter on fundamental human rights. Obligations, duties, and responsibilities are also
placed upon states by the international legal system. These duties are derived from a
myriad of sources including (but not limited to): treaties, international covenants, decisions
of committees, decisions of regional and international adjudicative bodies, and customary
international law.
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What Laws Bind Sri Lanka to Human Rights?
According to Udagama, “there seems to be a firm recognition by the judiciary and the
political system that the post-independence Sri Lankan legal system was, and continues to
be, dualist in nature.”3 The effect of Sri Lanka’s dualism is that international conventions
and treaties that Sri Lanka signs and ratifies have no legal effect within the territory of Sri
Lanka unless Sri Lanka incorporates those commitments into its national law. Udagama
cites several cases such as Leelawathie v Minister of Defence and External Affairs where
the Supreme Court held that the UDHR “…has no binding force as it is not a legal
instrument and forms no part of the law of this country”4. The dualist nature of Sri Lanka
was further endorsed more broadly in the Sepala Ekanayake case where the Supreme
Court held that Sri Lanka’s ratification of international treaties and conventions could not
be acted upon without domestically enacted enabling legislation.5 Udagama cites Singarasa

v Attorney General as the latest case (as of 2014) that endorsed Sri Lanka as a dualist state.6
In this case a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court stated that the rights recognized by a
ratified treaty “could not be directly invoked under domestic law in the absence of
incorporating legislation.” 7 Only two ratified treaties have been incorporated through
legislation in Sri Lanka: the ICCPR and the Convention Against Torture (CAT).8 It appears
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then that the human rights contained in the domestic legal system have the strongest grip
on the Sri Lankan state.
The primary provisions and mechanisms relating to human rights are contained in Sri
Lanka’s constitution, specifically Chapter III, titled “Fundamental Rights”. Chapter III
provides the foundation upon which all other laws and mechanisms function. Chapter III
guarantees, inter alia, the freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 10), freedom
from torture (Article 11), the right to equality (Article 12), freedom from arbitrary arrest,
detention and punishment, and prohibition of retrospective penal legislation (Article 13),
and freedom of speech, assembly, association, occupation, movement etc. (Article 14). As
stated above in Chapter 2, Sri Lanka may derogate from these rights under the grounds set
out in Article 15.
The Sri Lankan legal system also contains several penal code provisions meant to
supplement the freedoms above. The Sri Lankan Penal Code contains a chapter (Chapter
XV) relating to offences against religion.9 These penal code provisions focus on protecting
religious feeling and protecting the sanctity of places of worship and religious symbols. The
Penal Code of Sri Lanka through s. 290 makes it an offence to injure or defile a place of
worship with the intent to insult the religion of any class of persons. This offence attracts
either a prison term which may extend for up to two years, a fine, or both. S. 290A of the
Penal Code makes it an offence to “[do] any act, in or upon, or in the vicinity of, any place
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of worship or any object which is held sacred or in veneration by any class of persons with
the intention of wounding … religious feelings…with the knowledge that [those persons are]
likely to consider such act as an insult to their religion.”10 S. 291 makes it an offence to
voluntarily cause a disturbance to a religious assembly.11 S. 291A makes it an offence to
utter words, make any sound in the hearing of a person, or make a gesture in the sight of
a person, or places any object in the sight of a person that would wound the religious
feeling of that person.12 Under s. 291B, it is an offence to deliberately and maliciously
“[outrage] the religious feelings of any class of persons, by words, either spoken or written,
or by visible representations, insults or attempts to insults or attempts to insult the religion
or the religious belief of that class.”13 According to s.292 of the Penal Code, it is an offence
to trespass “in any place of worship or on any place of sepulture or any place set apart for
the performance of funeral rites…with the intention of wounding the feelings of any person,
or of insulting the religion of any person, or with the knowledge that the feelings of any
person are likely to be wounded, or that the religion of any person is likely to be insulted
thereby.”14 Each of these provisions carry a minimum sentence either of one or two years
of imprisonment or a fine. These laws are essentially laws against blasphemy. Although the
laws religious feelings in general (and not Buddhist religious feelings alone), in practice
these provisions have been used against persons who have “offended” Buddhist sentiment.
For example, in 2014 a British tourist was held in an immigration detention camp and then
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deported for “hurting others' religious feelings” because she had a tattoo of Buddha on her
arm.15 It appeared not to matter that the tourist was a practicing Buddhist.16
Article 3(1) ICCPR Act is another important provision that appears to supplement the
constitutional provisions on fundamental rights. Article 3(1) of the ICCPR Act states that
“[n]o person shall propagate war or advocate national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.” 17. A person found guilty
under Article 3(1) of the ICCPR Act is punished with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding
ten years.18 This offence is also cognizable and non-bailable.19
However, while the penal code provisions and Article 3(1) of the ICCPR Act may appear
to support the protection of religious sentiments and religious symbols of all religious
communities, these provisions have largely been used to restrict freedom of expression and
to prosecute persons who supposedly insult Buddhism. It is a deeper question whether
religious freedom can be interpreted as the state’s duty to give religions the assurance that
their truth is the ultimate truth. However, in a country as religiously diverse as Sri Lanka,
trying to give everyone an assurance that their idea of truth is the only truth would result
in never-ending religious warfare. Therefore, the only workable interpretation of religious
freedom in Sri Lanka can be giving everyone the freedom to practice one’s religion without
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infringing on another’s right or committing a criminal act. In this context weaponizing the
ICCPR Act is unjustifiable.
According to Gehan Gunethileke, in the 12 years since the enactment of the ICCPR Act
“not a single person who has incited violence against a minority group in Sri Lanka has
been convicted under the Act; this is despite four major incidents of mob violence against
the Muslim community in the past five years: Aluthgama in 2014, Gintota in 2017, Digana
and Teldeniya in 2018, and Kurunegala and Gampaha in 2019.”20 In April 2019, awardwinning author and poet Shakthika Sathkumara was arrested and remanded under s. 291
of the Penal Code and Article 3(1) of the ICCPR for writing a book that depicted a gay
monk. 21 The arrest was condemned by other Sri Lankan writers, academics, legal
commentators, and film directors for violating the freedom of expression of the writer. 22
Additionally, people wearing or selling garments that depict a “dharmachakraya” (a
Buddhist religious symbol) or even a ship’s steering wheel (which is identical in appearance
to a dharmachakraya) have been prosecuted for insulting Buddhism as recently as May
2019.23
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Figure 3. A Muslim woman wearing a garment depicting a ship’s steering wheel (deemed by the police to
be a representation of the dharmachakraya) was arrested and detained in 2019 .24

Abdul Raheem Masaheena, the woman detained for wearing a garment that supposedly
contained an image of the dharmachakkraya (seen in Figure 3.) filed a fundamental rights
petition in court for being unjustly remanded.25 Masaheena in her petition states that her
arrest, detention and the conduct of the police was “arbitrary, malicious, and did not follow
due process or the law.” Masaheena’s petition further states that “it appears she had been
singled out and subjected to hostile inimical discrimination based on both grounds of race
and religion in violations of Article 12(2) of the Constitution” and that her arrest and
detention are in “violation of [her] fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 13(1)
and/or 13(2) and/or 13(3) and/or 13(5) of the Constitution.”26 At time of writing this thesis,
Masaheena’s case is still at the preliminary stages before the Supreme court. Shakthika
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Sathkumara (the imprisoned author) also petitioned the Supreme Court alleging a violation
of his fundamental rights.27 These arrests raise important questions regarding how laws
meant to protect religious freedom are misused and are in reality used hyper-sensitively to
defend Buddhist sentiments. When laws meant to protect minorities and religious
sentiments are misused in this way, the mechanisms that enable independent bodies to
judge and decide upon the application and realisation of laws become especially important.
Several key mechanisms exist to ensure the realisation of the rights in Chapter III. The first
among these is provided for by Article 17 of the Constitution of Sri Lanka which states that
“[every] person shall be entitled to apply to the Supreme Court, as provided by Article
126, in respect of the infringement or imminent infringement, by executive or
administrative action, of a fundamental right to which such person is entitled under the
provisions of [the Fundamental Rights Chapter]” of the Constitution.28 According to Article
126(4) the Supreme Court “shall have power to grant such relief or make such directions
as it may deem just and equitable in the circumstance in respect of any petition or
reference…or refer the matter back to the Court of Appeal if in its opinion there is no
infringement of a fundament right or language right.”29 This includes the power to grant
monetary compensation. For example, the Supreme Court granted SLR 100, 000.00 as
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compensation to two Jehovah’s Witnesses who were deemed to have been illegally arrested
and detained.30
A second mechanism is made available by the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka
which was established in Sri Lanka in 1996 to “promote and protect human rights in the
country”.31 The Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (HRCSL) is an independent
commission empowered to investigate and report on human rights violations. 32 Under
section 12 of Act No. 21 of 1996, “the Supreme Court may refer any matter arising in the
course of a hearing of an application made to the Supreme Court under Article 126 of the
Constitution to the Commission for inquiry and report” and “the Commission shall inquire
and report to the Supreme Court on the matters referred to it.”33 Additionally the HRCSL
may investigate on its own instigation or on a complaint made by an aggrieved party or on
a complaint made by a person on behalf of an aggrieved party.34 If an investigation by the
HRCSL does not disclose an infringement or an imminent infringement of human rights,
the complainant is informed of this within thirty days.35 If an infringement or an imminent
infringement of a fundamental human right by executive or administrative action is found
the HRCSL may refer the matter to conciliation or mediation. 36 Where conciliation or
mediation is inappropriate or rejected by the parties involved the HRCSL may recommend
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prosecution or that proceedings be initiated in court.37 The HRCSL may also make specific
recommendations to the authority or persons concerned to prevent or remedy the
infringement. 38 A third mechanism is created by Article 156 of the Constitution of Sri
Lanka which
[provides] for the establishment of the office of the Parliamentary
Commissioner for Administration (Ombudsman) charged with the duty of
investigating and reporting upon complaints or allegations of the infringement
of fundamental rights and other injustices by public officers and officers of
public corporations, local authorities and other like institutions.39
The Ombudsman too possesses powers of investigation. Upon the conclusion of the
investigation the Ombudsman must report his or her determination together with reasons
to the head of the institution concerned, and the minister to whom the department, public
corporation, local authority or other institution concerned has been assigned. 40 The
Ombudsman also submits an annual report to parliament detailing the complaints received
and recommended action.
These three mechanisms are several key means through which the state is bound to human
rights. These mechanisms make reference to and use the laws that bind the state to human
rights in their investigations to bring about the realisation of rights promised in the
constitution. Ironically, these mechanisms, especially the Supreme Court, in addition to
binding state action to human rights, may also reinforce the state’s obligations to Buddhism.
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In the next section, we see how the Supreme Court chose to restrictively interpret the
constitutional provision that grants citizens the freedom of religion in favour of “protecting”
and “fostering” Buddhism.

Case: Restrictions on Proselytization
The question of how far a state should interfere with the private affairs of the individual
has been a perennial concern. Drawing the boundaries on legitimate conversion is
inherently difficult because religious belief is an internal phenomenon that concerns the
conscience, heart and mind of an individual. There exist instances of conversion for
monetary gain, material benefit, and for the purposes of marriage. In cases regarding
proselytization–internationally and nationally—the question of when and why should a state
interfere in these instances has been largely focused on forcible conversion and undue
pressure. Therefore, the state’s role in regulating conversion is murky. As such, an analysis
of the ethical nature of spurious conversions such as these is beyond the scope of this thesis.
In international law, paragraph 3 of General Comment No. 22, the Human Rights
Committee decisively stated that the freedom of conscience, thought and religion are
“protected unconditionally.”41 It follows from this that the freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion grants individuals the freedom to convert to another religion if one so desires.
Tied closely to this is the freedom to proselytize. According to the Special Rapporteur
“proselytism is itself inherent in religion, which explains its legal status in international
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instruments and in the 1981 Declaration.” 42 The UN Office of the Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) observes that “many human rights instruments stipulate and the
Human Rights Committee hold that the right to manifest one's religion includes carrying
out actions to persuade others to believe in a certain religion” and cites article 6(d) of the
1981 Declaration (which states that the practice of the freedom of religion includes the
freedom, "to write, issue and disseminate relevant publications…"), Resolution 2005/40 of
the Commission on Human Rights (where the Commission on Human Rights urged States
"[t]o ensure, in particular… the right of all persons to write, issue and disseminate relevant
publications") , and General Comment No. 22 (where the Human Rights Committee held
that "the practice and teaching of religion or belief includes acts integral to the conduct by
religious groups of their basic affairs [and]…the freedom to prepare and distribute religious
texts or publications").43 It is thus clear that it is an international norm and standard of law
that the freedom of thought, conscience and religion includes the freedom to proselytize
and the freedom to convert to a religion of one’s choosing.
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In Sri Lanka, a few notable cases have dealt with proselytization, propagation of one’s
religion and conversion, with varying approaches. According to Owens “[t]he Supreme
Court has…seemingly been inconsistent on the question of the constitutionality of
conversions.” 44 These varying approaches appear to be the result of different benches
granting differing amounts of weigh to constitutional provisions. In a situation where the
Constitution of a state grants the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion “including
the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice”, and “the freedom, either
by himself or in association with others, and either in public or in private, to manifest his
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching”, and is silent regarding the
explicit right to propagate one’s religion, the court has two main choices: either recognize
the right to proselytize (the right to propagate one’s religion), or recognize that the right to
proselytize does not exist. The constitutional recognitions of the right to practice and teach
one’s religion combined with the right to adopt a religion of one’s choice, tip the scales in
favour of a judicial recognition of the right to proselytize. Further weighing the scales down
in favour of a recognition of a right to proselytize is its recognition under international law
as forming a part of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Therefore, in the
absence of an explicit prohibition on proselytization in the Constitution it was unusual that
the Supreme Court in the case of the Sisters of the Holy Cross case (2003) created a
prohibition based on the absence of an explicit recognition of the right to proselytize. In
this case, the Supreme Court denied citizens the right to propagate their religion on two
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main grounds: (i) the absence of an explicit acknowledgement of the right to propagate
one’s religion in the Constitution of Sri Lanka; and (ii) that providing services to vulnerable
groups constituted undue pressure.
The Supreme Court also relied on a paragraph from the decision of the ECtHR, in

Kokkinakis v. Greece (1993) to highlight that offering material or other social benefits in
order to induce conversion constituted undue pressure.45 One crucial difference between
the Greek Constitution and the Sri Lankan Constitution must be observed: Article 13 of
the Greek Constitution forbids proselytism in respect of all religions without distinction,
while the Sri Lankan Constitution does not contain such a prohibition. In the absence of
an explicit provision outlawing the propagation of one’s religion, the Supreme Court
attempted to choose what is morally right from what is morally wrong. The Supreme
Court’s actions of inserting its own morality into the interpretation of law is an example of
Realist understanding of the relationship between law, morality and the court. Even though
Realist conceptions of law provide an explanation of how judges apply their morality where
the law is vague, Realism does not justify a judge inventing a prohibition where there is
none.
The conflict of duties generated by this case was of two kinds. The first conflict was where
the court acted as a kind of religious court to determine if the conversion was a “true
conversion”. Here the justice of the Supreme Court were caught between a duty to their
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personal belief (her personal conviction that true belief in a religion is necessary to convert),
her duty to protect the freedom of thought, conscience and religion under Article 10, and
a duty to protect and foster Buddhism under Article 9. The judgement of the Sisters of the

Holy Cross case acknowledged Article 9 and stated that “[s]imilarly when there is no
fundamental right to propagate, if efforts are taken to convert another person to one's own
religion, such conduct could hinder the very existence of the Buddha Sasana.”46
In the Sisters of the Holy Cross case, the Supreme Court determined that
Although it is permissible under our Constitution for a person to manifest his
or her religion, spreading another religion would not be permissible as the
Constitution would not guarantee a fundamental right to propagate religion.
Even in situations where propagation is treated as a fundamental right
enshrined in a Constitution, the entitlement has not extended to convert
another person to one's own religion as that would impinge on the
'freedom(sic) of conscience.47
In the statement above the Supreme Court acknowledged that even if propagation of a
religion is allowed, one is not allowed to succeed at converting someone. It is bizarre that
according to the court, one may attempt to convert someone but not actually convert
someone. The only kind of propagation of a religion allowed by the state would be birthing
new members of a religious community. In deciding this case, the Sri Lankan Supreme
Court made reference to the UDHR, the ICCPR and decisions of the ECtHR in support
of its restrictions of proselytization.48 The court also cited Indian case law on conversion, a
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state that has its own controversies and human rights concerns regarding its anti-conversion
laws.49
In the Sisters of the Holy Cross case, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka referred to the ECtHR
cases of Larissis v. Greece and Kokkinakis v. Greece. In the former case, the Supreme
Court relied on the sentiment that “Article 9 [of the European convention on Human
Rights, the Freedom of thought, conscience and religion] does not…protect every act
motivated or inspired by a religion or belief” and that “it does not protect improper
proselytism, such as the offering of material or social advantage or the application of
improper pressure with a view to gaining new members for a Church”.50 The Supreme
Court also cites Article 18(2) of the ICCPR which prohibits coercion that would impair the
freedom of thought, conscience and religion.51 However, the facts of the case dealt with
proselytization by superior officers to subordinate airmen in the military and civilians. The
ECtHR found that since the superiors were commanding officers, the airmen being
subordinates, would not be able to rebuff their superior and therefore the proselytization
amounted to undue pressure. The ECtHR found that the civilians were not under a similar
obligation to listen to the commanding officers and that the same kind of relationship did
not exist between the commanding officer and the civilians (even though one of the civilians
suffered from a mental condition). The court found the commanding officers in violation
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of Article 9 of the ECHR for the airmen, but that there had not been a violation for the
civilians.52 The ECtHR stated that “[t]he Court finds it of decisive significance that the
civilians whom the applicants attempted to convert were not subject to pressures and
constraints of the same kind as the airmen.” It is this case that the Sri Lankan Supreme
Court applied to the Sisters of the Holy Cross case, even though the context did not involve
military personnel but civilians who were “free to accept or reject” the proselytization. The
Supreme Court of Sri Lanka reasoned that
[i]n a situation where toddlers, children, invalids, aged and refugees are
concerned, they would be in a similar or a worse position as that of an airman
under a superior officer in an air force, and the reasoning of the European
Court to the susceptibility of subordinate officers to superiors should apply with
greater force. Where there are special relationships that exist, preaching would
create a situation where there could be infringement of freedom of thought of
the person, who is under authority as there could be compulsion to that effect.53
The Supreme Court misrepresented and misapplied the reasoning used by the judges in
the Larissis and Others v. Greece. The civilians involved in the Larissis and Others v.

Greece were also suffering from “family problems and psychological distress.”54 Still, upon
the consideration of the circumstances and evidence, the ECtHR determined that there
had been no improper pressure applied to the civilians. Essentially, the Supreme Court of
Sri Lanka in its judgement attempted to equate offering someone “material and other social
advantages” with imposing improper pressure in a hierarchical relationship. However, the
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groups that the court identifies (toddlers, children, invalids, the aged and refugees) as being
vulnerable to undue pressure are not bound to receive services by the Sisters of the Holy
Cross. The organization lists its objectives thus:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

to spread knowledge of the Catholic Church;
to impart religious, educational and vocational training to youth;
to teach in Pre-Schools, Schools, Colleges and Educational Institutions;
to serve in Nursing Homes, Medical Clinics, Hospitals, Refugee Camps and like
institutions;
(e) to establish and maintain Creches, Day Care Centres, Homes for the elders,
Orphanages, Nursing Homes and Mobile Clinics and care for the infants, aged,
orphans, destitutes and the sick.55
However, all the services offered above (listed in (b), (c), (d) and (e) were also services
offered free of charge (or for a nominal fee) by the Sri Lankan state and other non-profit
organizations. Sri Lanka possesses universal healthcare and free education (up to and
including university). In this context, making use of the services offered by the Sisters of
the Holy Cross would have been completely voluntary. The services would also be only
one among many alternatives to state sponsored healthcare and education. For this reason,
the Supreme Court’s argument that the combination of the provision of these services by a
religious organization, availing one’s self of the services offered and the unequal
relationship between the service provider and service receiver creates undue pressure to
convert cannot stand. The court’s restriction of proselytization in this instance was not
justified. The judgement in this case suffers from insufficient analysis and a tacit acceptance
of the position of petitioner. The views of the petitioner regarding the threat to the existence
of Buddhism is accepted unchallenged and unquestioned. The term “charity” appears
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nowhere in the judgement. The court does not examine the role of charity in religious
organizations. The court does not explain how and why it is undesirable that “material and
other benefits” be used in conversion. No distinction is made between a legitimate
conversion and an illegitimate conversion. The Supreme Court in this case was attempting
to prevent “false conversions” by making it illegal to receive any benefit before, during, or
after the conversion as a possible material or social benefit for conversion.
This case was submitted to the UN Human Rights Committee by the Sisters of the Holy
Cross, where the Committee was of the opinion that, “it is a central tenet to spread
knowledge, to propagate their beliefs to others and to provide assistance to others. These
aspects are part of an individual’s manifestation of religion and free expression, and are
thus protected…”56 The Committee found the decision by the Supreme Court violated
Articles 18(1) and 26 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, namely
the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and equality before the law, and freedom
from discrimination.
The very next year several anti-conversion laws were drafted and subsequently challenged
in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court took a very different approach when it heard
a constitutional challenge to a bill titled “Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion”.
The bill which was sponsored by the JHU, attempted to criminalise forced conversion. In
this case, the court determined that the definition of “allurement” was too broad and that
a provision of the bill (that required converts to notify the Divisional Secretariat in the area
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where they lived of the conversion) violated Article 10, but that otherwise the Bill was in
compliance with Article 10 and 14(1)(e).57
Ultimately, it can be observed that the way in which the pendulum swings is a matter of
composition and at least in the Supreme Court, a question of each judge’s individual
opinion, and the primary issues determined to be the most pressing by the bench hearing
the case. Esufally observes that in many cases the Supreme Court decided cases regarding
religious rights as a procedural issue --- such as due process -- rather than through a
substantive analysis of the scope of the rights themselves.58 The Supreme Court trend of
deciding recent cases regarding religious freedoms on procedural grounds may be a
method of side-stepping the minefield that is the interpretation of Article 9.

Case: The Deeghavapi Case59
The Deeghavapi case (2009) is an example of a case where the Supreme Court used the
principles of due process and the rule of law to find that a groups’ religious rights had been
violated. In the Deeghavapi case, “the petitioners [which included Ven. Nannapurawe
Buddharakkitha, the chief incumbent of Deeghavapiya Raja Maha Viharaya as an
intervenient petitioner] [alleged] that the executive and or administrative action taken to
alienate the land - about 60 Acres to 500 Muslim families [infringed] the fundamental rights
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guaranteed under Article 10, 12(1), 12(2) of the constitution.”60 The petitioners alleged that
arbitrarily settling 500 Muslim families in a large expanse of land close to a Buddhist
heritage site and temple was discriminatory to Sinhalese and Tamil residents (who had also
requested land) in the area since Sinhalese Buddhists and Tamils would not be able to
reside close to the temple. It is interesting that in this case that Buddhist monks relied on
fundamental human rights and laws guaranteeing freedom from discrimination to protect
the interests of Sinhalese Buddhists, the majority ethnicity and religion. The justices of the
court -- which included the Chief Justice -- rather than analyse the scope of the cited rights
and answering an important question regarding the possible right of a religious community
to reside close to a religious site instead looked at the case through the lens of administrative
law, the principle of ultra vires and due process. It appears that the justices of the Supreme
Court were loath to interpret the scope of religious freedom under Article 10, 12(1), and
12(2) even where doing so would benefit the interests of the majority ethnicity and religion.
The Chief Justice concludes his judgement thusly:
State land is held by the executive in trust for the People and may be alienated
only as permitted by law….I hold that the impugned alienation is bereft of any
legal authority and has been effected in a process which is not bona fide.
Accordingly, the Petitioners have locus standi to implead such action…under
Article 126(6) of the Constitution. On the preceding analysis of evidence, the
Petitioners have established an infringement of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by Article 12(1), 12(2) and 10 of the Constitution.
The justices take the somewhat circuitous route of using the failure of the respondents to
follow due process to determine that the petitioners’ rights were violated instead of directly
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analysing the scope and application of the rights themselves to determine if there was an
infringement of the petitioners’ rights. It is also noted that Sarath N. Silva, CJ in his
judgement acknowledges at the beginning of the judgement that the petitioners are
“actively engaged in the protection of the Buddha Sasana”. No other mention is made
regarding the protection of the Buddha Sasana in the remainder of the judgement. Nor is
there any mention at all of Article 9. The wording used by the Chief Justice is reminiscent
of Article 9’s “duty of the State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana” and no reason is
given for the acknowledgement.61 It is unclear whether the Chief Justice was referencing
Article 9 and it is also unclear what the Chief Justice’s intention was in acknowledging the
Petitioner’s role as protectors of Buddhism in Sri Lanka.
It appears then that the Deeghavapi case is just another instance where the Supreme Court
was seemingly conflicted over its duties to Buddhism and its duties to human rights, even
where the interpretation of the scope of human rights would benefit the Sinhala-Buddhist
majority. This conflict is not limited to the courts but is also observable in the socio-religious
phenomenon of the child monk.

Case: The Child Monk
Let us analyse where the conflict occurs in the case of the child monk in Sri Lanka.
Admittedly, the child occupies a special position in law and enjoys more legal protections
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than an adult human being. The case of the child monk (known as “samanera” in Sri
Lanka) was chosen to highlight how, even with more legal protections than an adult human
being, the state fails to protect children who are harmed in the darkness of the void created
by the conflict of the secular human rights and deferential treatment proffered to a religion
by the state.
According to the United Nations Children’s Fund, “the Convention on the Rights of the
Child is the most widely and rapidly ratified human rights treaty in history,” with all states
in the international community being party to the convention, and only two states having
not ratified the treaty.62 This convention was divided into eight categories, one of which
clarified the civil rights and freedom of the child. According to Article 14 (1) of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, “States Parties shall respect the right of the child to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion”.63 The CRC however adds in Article 14 (2)
that “States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when applicable,
legal guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a
manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.”64 Article 14 (3) notes that the
“freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” 65 It is crucial to note that under
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international law, parents and legal guardians are only empowered to “provide direction”
and that religious freedom may be limited to protect the health of a child. The provisions
of the CRC also refer to the evolving capacities of the child. Through the lens of the CRC
the role of parents, legal guardians and societies at large seem to be clear on the boundaries
of parental involvement regarding religious instruction in a child’s life.
It is an important and central tenet of human rights discourse that humans gain human
rights at birth. Fundamental human rights do not have age limits, are universal, inalienable,
are indivisible, interdependent and inter-related. Henkin notes that “[the CRC]
convention’s recognition of children as rights holders has created tensions with the authority
that parents and other family members have traditionally exercised over children.” 66 Acts
of parental authority over a child are sometimes manifestations of religious belief. For
example, it is a religious tenet of Judaism and Islam that male children be circumcised. In
Sri Lanka, offering a male child to a Buddhist monastery is seen as an act that offers rewards
spiritually to the parents of the child. International human rights law (in its strictest sense)
may not consider sacrificing a child to an austere and ascetic monastery to be in the best
interest of the child, given the child’s right to family life and to a full life.
Several sources grant children rights. Primary among them is the Constitution of Sri Lanka.
These basic rights are buttressed by the ICCPR Act of Sri Lanka which in addition to
providing more specific civil, political, and cultural rights, contains a section specifically on
the rights of the child. The state duty to look after the “best interest of the child” is
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recognized under Article 5(2) of the ICCPR Act of Sri Lanka.67 One year after it ratified
the CRC, Sri Lanka adopted a policy document known as the “Charter on the Rights of
the Child”, “with a view to ensuring that standards of the Convention would guide law
reform and enforcement, policy formulation, and resource allocation.”68 According to the
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, “[the] Children’s Charter continues to be an
important and relevant policy document [in Sri Lanka].”69 The Children’s Charter is almost
identically modeled on the CRC, with one crucial difference regarding religion. Under the
Sri Lankan Children’s Charter, a home-grown addition appears in the form of Article 5(2)
of the Children’s Charter: “the State shall make it obligatory on every parent or guardian
of the child to bring up such child in a proper religious environment by educating the child
of the teachings and practices of the religion to which such child belongs with the goal of
developing good spirit in the mind of such child.”70 The Sri Lankan Children’s Charter
“obligation” placed on parents to bring up children in a religious environment is markedly
different from the “empowering” parents to provide “direction” under the CRC. An
obligation is where a person is morally or legally bound to do something. Where an
obligation is imposed compliance is not optional. However, when a parent is “empowered”,
the parent is merely given the authority to do something. The parent may or may not
exercise that authority. It appears that Sri Lanka legally requires that children be brought
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up in religious environment rather than a secular environment. According to a strict reading
of Article 5(2) of the Children’s Charter, in Sri Lanka, a parent who brings up a child in a
secular environment with a secular understanding of good and bad would be in violation
of a state mandated obligation.
Theoretically, Article 5(2) of the Children’s Charter sets the legal groundwork for parents
to submit their children to a monastery to be ordained. The parental act of entrusting a
child to a Buddhist monastery would simply be an act that satisfies a state-imposed
obligation to ensure that a child is brought up in a religious environment. In Sri Lanka,
parents give up children to monasteries for mainly one of two reasons: (i) the parents
believe that sacrificing a child to Buddhist monastery is spiritually rewarding; (ii) the parents
are in indigent circumstances, are unable to care for the child and believe that the child
will be well-looked after at the monastery. Parents of indigent circumstances often give up
their children to either a Buddhist monastery or to an orphanage when they are unable to
care for the child. Similarly, the children of parents who are financially secure are also sent
away to boarding school. One may ask: is there really a difference between the three? In
orphanages too children are, not infrequently, sexually and/or physically abused. One
could say that in a boarding school a child may be at risk of abuse. One may ask, what is
the difference between giving up a child to an orphanage (or even to a boarding school)
and giving up a child to a monastery? The clearest difference is that when parents of
indigent circumstances submit their children to a monastery, it is not just a question of
whether the children are going to be well fed, clothed, and taken care of. Children
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submitted to a monastery are submitted to a Buddhist way of life. Sri Lanka is a very
generous welfare state with government (and private) orphanages. These institutions fall
under oversight institutions to protect children. However, oversight institutions such as the
National Child Protection Authority have historically either ignored the plight of children
in orphanages, or faced deep resistance to their involvement in protecting child monks.
Child monks are recruited as young as seven and are asked to utter the words “Venerable
Sir, I respectfully ask you to ordain me as a novice monk, in order that I may be free from
the cycle of existence and attain Nibbana” to begin the process of committing themselves
to monkhood.71 The question arises whether it is ethical to commit children (especially
when they are so young) to monkhood when they do not know of Buddhist concepts such
as “the cycle of existence” and “Nibbana”. Furthermore, upon entering the monastery the
children are asked to bind themselves to the “ten precepts” of Buddhism, which contain
the following rules: “I undertake to abstain from taking food after midday” and “I undertake
to abstain from dancing, singing, music or any kind of entertainment.” 72 However,
according to the World Health Organization (WHO), “the deprivation of food resulting in
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hunger” is a manifestation of child abuse and neglect.73 According Article 5(1)(c) of the
ICCPR Act “every child has the right to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or
degradation.”
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The monastic ban on “dancing, singing, music or any kind of

entertainment” is a stark and direct violation of the child’s right to leisure, recreation and
cultural activities recognized by Article 31 of the CRC and Article 31 of the Children’s
Charter.75 Article 31 of the Children’s Charter states:
31. The State shall –
(a) recognize the right of the child to have leisure hours to engage in play and
recreational activities appropriate to the age of the child to participate freely in
cultural life and arts; and
(b) respect and promote the right of the child to participate in cultural and
artistic life and provide for appropriate and equal opportunities for cultural,
artistic recreational and leisure activity.76
These rights are reinforced by the constitutional guarantee in Article 14(1)(f) of the
Constitution that “[e]very citizen is entitled to the freedom by himself or in association with
others to enjoy and promote his own culture…”77 In General Comment No. 17, a legal
analysis of Article 31 by the Child Rights Committee posited that “[r]ecreation is an
umbrella term used to describe a very broad range of activities, including, inter alia,
participation in music, art, crafts…” and that
[t]he Committee endorses the view that it is through cultural life and the arts
that children and their communities express their specific identity and the
meaning they give to their existence, and build their world view representing
73

Kru[g, Etienne G et al, eds. World report on violence and health, rep. (Geneva: World Health
Organization, 2002) 61 in Box 3.1.
74 Article 5(1)(c) ICCPR Act No. 56 of 2007.
75 See Anandajoti. “A Day in the Life of a Sri Lankan Child Monk”, online: Dharma Documentaries
<https://dharma-documentaries.net/a-day-in-the-life-of-a-child-monk> for a glimpse into a day in the life of a
Sri Lankan child monk. Observe the lack of scheduled time for play or recreation. Of course, the monastery
may have wished to enhance the “religiosity” of feeling in documentary by omitting play time.
76 Article 31, The Charter on the Rights of the Child 1992, Sri Lanka.
77 Article 14(1)(f), Constitution of Sri Lanka 1978.

69

their encounter with external forces affecting their lives. Cultural and artistic
expression is articulated and enjoyed in the home, school, streets and public
spaces, as well as through dance, festivals… ceremonies, rituals, theatre,
literature, music, cinema, exhibitions, film, digital platforms and video. Culture
derives from the community as a whole; no child should be denied access
either to its creation or to its benefits.78
The monastic ban on music, singing, and dancing for child monks, then, is in violation of
both international and national law.
Generally, states only actively separate children from parents where there is evidence or
suspicion of abuse. There are accusations that sexual abuse against child monks is
rampant.79 However only three Buddhist monks have been convicted of child abuse in
recent history.80 According to the BBC, “research carried out by the BBC Sinhala service
has revealed that over the last decade, nearly 110 Buddhist monks have been charged for
sexual and physical assaults on minors in Sri Lanka”.81
Yet, despite the clear violation of the rights of child monks the Sri Lankan state has
periodically actively sourced children for monasteries and monkhood in their thousands.
For example, in 2001, Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickramanayake (who was also the
Minister for Buddhist Affairs) attempted to recruit 2000 boys for ordination and again in
2010, another Prime Minister D. M Jayaratne (who was also the Minister of Buddha Sasana
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(Buddhism) and Religious Affairs) planned to ordain 2600 boys within the year. 82 The
reason given for the state-sponsored recruitment drives was that there was a danger to the
continued existence of Buddhism in the country; monks had complained to the Prime
Minister (in 2001) that fewer people were joining the clergy and that this lead to the closure
of many temples in the country.83
Submitting a child to be ordained at a Buddhist monastery is a ritualistic process. The
child’s head is shaved, normal everyday clothing is replaced by saffron robes. A
depersonalisation process takes place. The child is committed to monastic life. The question
may arise: do the rituals and the life of a child committed to monastic values violate the
child’s dignity? Are these violations “serious enough” that it merits state intervention to
protect the child? Sri Lanka, in this instance would be under a duty to protect and foster
Buddhism under Article 9 of the Constitution, and under a duty to look after the best
interest of the child according to its human rights obligations. In circumstances such as
these, if a state is caught between its tradition, history and dominant religion on one side,
and legitimate fears regarding the safety and well being of its citizens on the other, can a
state act neutrally if it contains a constitutional provision that decrees all state bodies to
protect and foster the dominant religion?
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Case: Alcohol Ban for Women
Buddhist monks have frequently criticized the government over more liberal policies
considered to be at odds with Sri Lanka’s (supposed) identity as a Buddhist State. For
example, in 2018 when Sri Lanka lifted a decades long restriction on women purchasing
alcohol in taverns, Buddhist monks and members of parliament were quick to criticize the
government for violating “Sri Lanka’s Buddhist values”.84 According to the BBC, “Leading
monks in the Buddhist-majority country had criticised the decision to lift the ban, arguing
it would destroy Sri Lankan family culture by getting more women addicted to alcohol.”85
The restriction was swiftly re-imposed by the President within days of the ban being lifted.
According to Kalana Senaratne, a senior lecturer at the Department of Law, University of
Peradeniya, “the president's desired voter base are rural Sinhalese Buddhists who reside
outside of Colombo”, “this electoral demographic would be inclined to see these acts
pertaining to alcohol as the president ‘consolidating Buddhist values’”.
The restriction on women’s ability to purchase alcohol was originally introduced in 1951
shortly after Sri Lanka achieved independence from the British in 1948. 86 The latest
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manifestation of the restriction was in Excise Notification No. 666 of 31 December 1979
which banned the sale of liquor to women ‘within the premises of a tavern’. 87 Verité
Research, a Sri Lankan think tank, noted that the public debate on the sale of liquor to
women is misinformed and that according to the law, women are barred from purchasing
alcohol “within a tavern.”88 Verité states that out of forty types of liquor licences there are
only two types of licences that apply to taverns in Sri Lanka: toddy tavern licences and
foreign liquor taverns, which are a rarity in Sri Lanka. Verité notes that “[t]his restriction
has no implication on the purchase of liquor almost anywhere else, which is almost
everywhere that liquor is sold.”89 However, Verité observes that “[p]ast discussions in the
press suggest that some sections of the Excise Department have promoted the view that the
terminology of ‘taverns’ (in the law) is applicable more generally to any retail outlet that
sells liquor (e.g. supermarkets). This view, however, appears to be untenable in law.”90
Whether the restriction is applied in very limited circumstances or not, any restriction that
women are subjected to that men are not would be considered discrimination under Article
12 of the Constitution of Sri Lanka.
While women have been restricted from purchasing alcohol in certain circumstances, the
same restrictions have not applied to men. It could be argued that the restriction placed on
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women buying alcohol in taverns in 1951 was the product of general, secular, run-of-themill sexism and therefore cannot be considered a circumstance where a state acted on its
duty towards a preferred religion instead of respecting a fundamental right.91 Little to no
evidence exists that the original imposition, nor the restatement in 1979 was done in the
name of Buddhism or Buddhist values. In 1951, Sri Lanka did not possess constitutionally
guaranteed fundamental rights, although it did in 1979 (under the Constitution of 1978)
when the restriction was restated in Excise Notification No. 666 of 31 December 1979.
However, the re-imposition of the restriction in January 2018 was done in the name of
Buddhist values as evidenced by numerous media reports on statements made by Buddhist
monks and Members of Parliament.92 The re-imposition of the restriction in the name of
Buddhist values is especially significant because in 2018 jurisprudence, law, and general
discourse regarding equality and human rights had developed rapidly since 1979. Sri Lanka
has guaranteed to its citizens the right to equality and freedom from discrimination on the
grounds of sex in both autochthonous, republican constitutions since independence. Sri
Lanka has also signed and ratified numerous human rights conventions such as the UDHR
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(1955), the ICCPR (1980) and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) (1981) which include a clear requirement from states of a dedication
to equality.
Two fundamental rights petitions were filed against the re-imposition of the ban by a group
of Sri Lankan women and by the Center for Policy Alternatives on the basis of Article 10
[freedom of thought], Article 12(1) [equal protection of the law], Article 12(2) [non
discrimination] and Article 14(1)(g) [freedom to engage in a lawful occupation,
profession].93 The petitions were granted leave to proceed but no further reports have been
made of developments in the case to date. 94 Unlike the case of the Child Monk and the
cases on the restrictions on proselytization, the (re)imposition of restrictions on women
buying alcohol because of “Buddhist values” is rather “cut and dry”. When caught between
two duties -- the duty to uphold religious values and the duty to human rights (specifically
the right to equality and freedom from discrimination on the basis of sex) – the government
in this instance chose to uphold religious values at the expense of human rights. It is yet to
be seen whether the courts or any party defending the position of the executive to reimpose the ban would refer to Article 9 in buttressing its position.
It is apparent that the Sri Lankan state understands that there is a conflict and has tried to
resolve the conflict through laws and amendments. For example, the Nineteenth
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Amendment to the Constitution in 2015 amended the Constitution to ensure through Art.
14A(4), “that the Constitutional Council [an independent body that oversees, inter alia,
appointments to other independent bodies in Sri Lanka] reflects the pluralistic character of
Sri Lankan society, including professional and social diversity”.95 Additionally, in its most
recent effort in June 2019, it was reported that Sri Lanka was readying itself to introduce
laws on hate speech.96 Sri Lanka has leapt hither tither between the two duties and on
occasion has tried to contort itself in trying to fulfil both duties at the same time (seen in
the above cases). But do the means and systems the state employs to patch up the fissures
caused by the conflict resolve problems or do they create new problems?
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Chapter 4
How a Religion becomes Political
To understand how religion imposes duties on a state it is necessary to analyse the position
of religion within society. To understand how religion works within and outside the state
paradigm, we must first situate religion in relation to the state. In the category of states I
have analysed the majority religion and the state, seen as two autonomous entities, are in
an uneasy alliance. In states with a preferred or endorsed religion religious organizations
become increasingly political. In Sri Lanka for example, this has been signified by monks
entering politics by forming their own political parties such as the JHU and the Bodu Bala
Senawa (Buddhist Power Force, an extremist Buddhist organization allied with the 969
Movement of Burma) requesting special courts to hear cases relating to Buddhist monks.1
In Chapters 2 and 3 above, we saw how Buddhism was introduced to Sri Lanka and how
Buddhism was fostered by the state, but what we did not see was Buddhist organizations
vying for power and political influence. At times there were sects that were vying for power,
not only over the King, but between themselves as well. In these times, the king allied with
one sect and shut down the other. There are accounts of Buddhist monks originating in
India attempting to set up sects in Sri Lanka, but being expelled by the reigning king who
subscribed to the Theravada Buddhist tradition. For example, when “a number of Indian
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adherents of the Vetullavada sect of Mahayana Buddhism came to Sri Lanka and were
allowed to stay at the Abhayagiri-vihara by the monks”, the king Voharika Tissa (269-291)
expelled the Indian monks from Sri Lanka.”2 Similarly, “a group, known as the Sagaliya
sect… associated with the Jetavana monastery” had a similar fate at the hands of King
Gothabhaya (309CE to322CE) who “had sixty of the Vetullavada monks arrested, expelled
from the order, and deported to India.” 3 King Parakramabahu the First (1123–1186)
“provided for the Sangha to be headed by a monk who came to be known as the
Sanghara¯ja, ‘King of the Sangha’, and ruled by him with two deputies; these officers were
appointed by the king on the Sangha’s advice.”4 Gombrich observes that “such a political
organization for the Sangha was something quite new. It has been imitated at times in the
Theravadin countries of continental southeast Asia.”5
Religions occupy a special position in a society. Religion is at once private and public.
Religion is private because religious belief, religious worship and its meaning are intensely
personal. However, religion crosses over to the realm of the public when it dictates
behaviour. Tension may arise when religion does not tally with the law of the state. This
tension is largely a result of two competing value systems fighting to establish their authority
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over the same set of subjects in the same territory. In this context, religious values can be
viewed in two ways: (i) ideological; and (ii) cultural.6

Ideological Religious Values
A religion by definition is “belief in and worship of a superhuman controlling power,
especially a personal God or gods”.7 Each religion requires that individuals subscribe to its
dogma, or “truth”. These ideologies are carefully curated by religious institutions. 8
However, these ideologies are not uniformly believed or subscribed to by religious
congregations. In fact, many major religions have splintered into groups that have separated
themselves from a main religion over disagreements over dogma. For example, during the
Reformation, Protestants splintered from Roman Catholicism due to disagreements in their
belief on the role of the Bible, and the authority of the Church, among others. Protestants
believe that the Bible is the only book from God, while Catholics believe in instruction
from the Catholic Church and tradition in addition to the Bible.
Religious ideology fuels the outlook and behaviour of its adherents. Religious teaching
often instructs its congregations and communities on how to live their daily lives. The
clearest example of this are the six axioms of faith in Islam, one of which is belief in the
existence of books of which God is the author. The last of these books, the Quran, sets
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down prescriptive rules regarding behaviour for the followers of Islam, such as prayer times
and the avoidance of certain food items. A fair number of topics that are subjects of
religious instruction are outside the purview of the state. For example, Catholicism
proscribes the seven deadly sins: lust, gluttony, greed, sloth, wrath, envy, and pride. Even
the Ten Commandments are not fully within state purview. While murder and stealing are
punished by the liberal democratic state, idolatry, adultery, disrespecting one’s parents,
and envy are not punished. So far, religious ideology appears to be confined to the private
sphere. When then does religious ideology move into the public sphere?

Where Ideology Becomes Action
The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity in its preamble defined culture
as “the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or
a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of
living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.”9 It follows from this definition that a
community of individuals sharing a particular religion would possess its own cultural
practices, ways of living,

based on common ideology, values, and traditions. These

religious and cultural values must necessarily manifest in behaviour, for culture is not
confined purely to the mind.
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Culture and Religious Values
There is fierce debate regarding the exact relationship between religion and culture. This
debate has been spurred on in modern times by radical Islamic movements, questions
around head scarves and questions regarding the legality of abortion. 10 Religion and
religious ideology are especially invoked as a defense for cultural practices that violate the
human rights of women and girl-children.11 Examples include Female Genital Mutilation
(FGM), forcing girls into child marriages, dowry systems, allowing husbands control over
land, finances, freedom of movement, and rights over children, male guardianship over
women, a husband’s right to obedience and the power to discipline his wife, honour
killings, compulsory restrictive dress codes, virginity tests, the restriction of women to the
roles of housewives or mothers, the prevention of menstruating women, or women in
general entering religious buildings or touching sacred scriptures.
Criticism against these cultural practices are often considered attacks against the religion.
Religious tenets and ideology are often used to protect cultural practices, like those listed
above, that obviously violate the human rights of individuals. However, the UNESCO
Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity in Article 4 states that “No one may invoke
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cultural diversity to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by international law, nor to
limit their scope.”12 Alston and Goodman discussing the UDHR observe that
“The two Covenants [the ICCPR and ICESCR], with state parties from all the
world’s regions, also speak in universal terms: ‘everyone’ has the right to liberty,
‘all persons’ are entitled to equal protection, ‘no one’ shall be subjected to
torture, ‘everyone’ has the right to an adequate standard of living. Neither in
the definitions of rights nor in the limitation clause…does the text of these basic
instruments make any explicit concession to cultural variation.”13
Most domestic fundamental rights provisions too make use of universalist language. For
example Argentina (which supports the Roman Catholic Faith) guarantees in Article 14 of
its constitution, that “all inhabitants of the Nation” enjoy rights such as “working in and
practicing any lawful industry; of navigating and trading; of petitioning the authorities…of
publishing their ideas through the press without prior censorship…of associating for useful
purposes; of freely practicing their religion; of teaching and learning.”14
Does this mean then that religious cultural practices are capable of being restricted and
outlawed on human rights grounds? This kind of restriction is in fact very common. Female
Genital Mutilation has been outlawed in the US, Canada, Australia, Burkina Faso, Nigeria,
Denmark, and South Africa among many others. 15 However, this kind of restriction
engenders resentment by religious communities against the state and the prohibited
behaviour continues under the cover of darkness. Additionally, the selective restriction of
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cultural practices particular to certain religions could be used as a tool by governments to
discriminate against religions on human rights grounds.
This creates a dilemma: the freedom of religion protects religious communities from
external actors seeking to repress their expression of religion and belief. But certain cultural
practices and traditions within religions, informed by religious ideology violate the human
rights of women and children within those communities. In order to protect those groups,
states must legislate against those cultural practices and traditions, thereby infringing the
freedom of religion of the larger religious group. The UN Human Rights Committee in
General Comment No. 22 notes that Article 18 of the ICCPR “distinguishes the freedom
of thought, conscience, religion or belief from the freedom to manifest religion or belief. It
does not permit any limitations whatsoever on the freedom of thought and conscience or
on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice” (emphasis added).16
General Comment No. 22 goes on to note that “Article 18.3 permits restrictions on the
freedom to manifest religion or belief only if limitations are prescribed by law and are
necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others.” 17 However, it is important to note that the ability to restrict the
manifestation of religions also creates a situation that could be misused by governments
who wish to restrain certain religious communities.
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Conflicting Ideals
Each religion views its own worldview as “truth” and thereby universal. This is the reason
why most religions preach and proselytize “non-believers”. Alston and Goodman observe
that to the relativist international instruments such as the UDHR, the ICCPR, the ICESCR
and “their pretension to universality” denotes “the arrogance or ‘cultural imperialism’ of
the West, “given the West’s traditional urge – expressed, for example, in political ideology
(liberalism) and in religious faith (Christianity) – to view its own forms and beliefs as
universal, and to attempt to universalise them.”18
Henkin observes that like “statehood, sovereignty, nationality, as well as popular
sovereignty, democracy, constitutionalism – the idea of human rights grew in and out of
“the West” out of a tradition that included the monotheistic religions, Greece and Rome,
Europe and its political offspring.”19 The liberal democratic tradition with its civil liberties
may have been heavily influenced by monotheistic religions, especially Christianity, but in
modern times its evolution since the Enlightenment has been guided more and more by
secular thought. Raday notes that
Human rights doctrine, as we know it today, is a product of the shift from a
religious to secular state culture at the time of the Enlightenment in eighteenthcentury Europe. The religious paradigm was replaced by secularism,
communitarianism by individualism, and status by contract. The modern
concept of human rights is the child of secularism.20
Liberal tradition as we know it was
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articulated in the aftermath of the seventeenth-century European wars of
religion. Key liberal notions (toleration, state sovereignty, individual freedom,
the rights of conscience, neutrality, public reason) were elaborated as a
response to this distinctive experience of politico-religious conflict.21
Aspland notes that in Indonesia human rights “often tend to be portrayed and perceived
in such a manner that they appear as a quasi-religion or an alternative belief system” and
that “human rights emerge as a competitor challenging existing belief systems, ideologies
and religions.”22 This is a view apparently supported by the Roman Catholic Cardinal
Malcom Ranjith in Sri Lanka who was quoted saying
“[human] rights have become the new religion of the west as if it's a new
discovery, but people in our country have been following religions for
centuries…there is no need to talk about protecting any of these human rights
if we follow our religions properly, because they take us beyond any of these
ideas. It is those who are not following any religion who talk about all these
human rights issues. We shouldn't get entangled in this spell, and must act
intelligently.”23
It appears that legally and politically, religion and the state (along with its founding
ideologies) as entities are separable institutions that possess their own ideologies and tools
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to maintain power. In fact, this is a common complaint against human rights: that human
rights serve as a cover to impose western values and culture on other civilizations and
cultures. This is similar to the sentiment of proponents of “Asian Values” and “cultural
relativism”. Both Asian Values and cultural relativism begin from the point of insisting that
all cultures and civilizations are equal but prioritise differing elements. The volume of cases
on religious freedom and the legality of government action limiting manifestations of
religion illustrates the push and pull between the values of the state and religious
community.

Types of Conflict
According to the Pew Center, one in five countries globally possess a preferred or favoured
religion.24 In the constitutions of states that endorse a single religion above others, the
constitutional provision that endorses the religion acknowledges the “specialness” of the
endorsed religion and distinguishes it from other religions. For example, the Constitution
of Myanmar in Chapter VIII, Article 361 states that “The Union recognizes the special
position of Buddhism as the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens of the
Union.”25 Superficially a state’s support or preference for a particular religion may appear
harmless. However, an ideological conflict occurs within a constitution when a constitution
singles out a particular religion for support. There are two types of ideological conflicts: (i)
a conflict between the ideology of the endorsed/ preferred religion and the ideology of
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other religions within that territory (ii) a conflict between the ideology of the endorsed/
preferred religion and the ideology of the liberal democratic tradition;.
A conflict of the first kind occurs if a state is duty bound to abide by the ideology of a
particular religion, and at the same time is governed by laws and policies derived from an
ideological tradition based in secularism. This is so even if the endorsed/preferred religion
is Christianity, for although liberal democratic thought has some of its roots in Christian
doctrine, liberal democratic thought has evolved to become increasingly secular. For
example, a majority of Christian Churches oppose the legalization of gay marriage which
is granted under equality rights provisions. A conflict of the second kind occurs when the
state is duty bound to support one religion and also protect the religious freedoms of other
religions with differing ideological traditions. It is important to note that ideology is not
limited to the mind but manifests itself in action and behaviour.
A second conflict occurs when a state does not begin from a position of neutrality in
granting religious freedoms, restricting religious behaviour, and prescribing behaviour. In
a country as communally diverse as Sri Lanka it is inevitable for some opinions to trump
over others, but where this happens through a democratic process there will be no conflict.
The conflict occurs when the constitution has artificially promised a religion foremost place
and tries to satisfy that promise, for the freedom to manifest one’s religion is not an
unlimited, completely inviolable right.26 For reasons such as national security, public order,
matters of public health, among other things, a state may see fit to reduce of the scope of

26

UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22

87

the manifestation of one’s religion. For example, Sri Lanka places restrictions on all
freedoms – including the freedom of thought, conscience and religion – under eight
circumstances listed in Article 15 of the Constitution of Sri Lanka.27 If a state does not
begin from a place of neutrality, any restrictions placed on a religious communities may

appear to target religions not endorsed by the state, even during circumstances when they
do not. When ever a restriction is placed on the manifestation of religion, the following
questions will always arise: is the restriction placed on a religion/ religions a result of a
legitimate, neutral state duty to its citizens, or is the restriction placed on religion/religions
in the interest of the endorsed religion as the result of a perceived threat to the endorsed
religion? Is the state acting on its duty to protect its citizens or on its duty to protect the
endorsed religion?
A state’s endorsement of a religion may also create a sense of alienation and “other”
religious minorities. McCrea observes that “Sager and Eisgruber, and Nussbaum have
spoken of the sense of alienation, exclusion, or inferiority that may be produced when
individuals see state endorsement of a faith they do not share but it is not clear whether
this sense of alienation or inferiority is itself a rights violation or whether it is problematic
for other reasons.”28 The sense of alienation or inferiority McCrea speaks of cannot be a
rights violation by itself. State violations of human rights have been acknowledged to be
difficult to measure even in situations where states have been found to ill-treat prisoners by
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prison officials- an instance which deals with direct action by a state agent.29 The sense of
alienation or inferiority created by a state endorsement of a majority religion by itself is too
abstract an emotion or feeling to trace any kind of direct harm to minority religious
communities. No direct connection can be drawn between the emotions of alienation,
exclusion or inferiority to the violation of any particular human right. The question would
arise: which human right would be violated? Additionally, current human rights discourse
does not have a clear answer to the question of “whose intentions are important for
determining whether actions constitute state violations of a human rights?”30 Who would
be held responsible for the inclusion of the endorsement of the religion in the constitution?

Between State Neutrality and Secularism
States that do not possess strict separation between the state and religion could argue that
an endorsement of a single religion by the state does not equal discrimination of other
religions, and that a religious state is capable of neutrality to all religions.31 However the
UN Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief, Ahmed Shaheed observes in his most
recent report that “where a State explicitly associates itself with particular religion(s) or truth
claim(s), members of unaffiliated groups invariably suffer various forms of discrimination
— including direct, indirect, or both — which have a negative impact on their ability to
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exercise their freedom of religion or belief.”32 It is unclear in this instance whether the
rapporteur by using the term “explicitly associates” is referring only to theocratic states or
to both theocratic states and states that endorse or give preferential treatment to religion.
The UN Human Rights Committee in paragraph 9 of General Comment 22 observes that
the fact that a state recognizes an official religion or that its followers comprise the majority
of a population “shall not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any rights under
the covenant.”33 However, the use of the term “shall not” by the committee implies that
states are capable of denying those belonging to a minority religion or belonging to a
religion not endorsed by the state their rights. Paragraph 9 is a directive to these states not
to do so. Paragraph 9 is not explicit approval by the UN of state religions, or states giving
particular religions preferential treatment. The UN Rapportuer too warns that “[a] State
must…ensure that the “purpose” or “effect” of its entanglement with religion does not lead
to “the nullification or impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human
rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis”.34
Religious neutrality is increasingly considered “a necessary characteristic of contemporary
democratic states”. 35 Moon (writing of the Canadian context) observes that “the
requirement of state neutrality (that the state should take no position on religious issues)
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may be understood as simply a pragmatic recognition that religious issues are difficult to
resolve within the political process and may generate significant social and political conflict
and so are best removed from political contest.”36 Is “religious neutrality” a code word for
“secularism”? Does religious neutrality mean a strict separation between state and religion?
There are those who argue that religious neutrality does not mean strict secularism. 37
Martinez-Torron states that “neutrality cannot be understood as synonymous with strict
separation between state and religion”. 38 Henrard observes that “state neutrality is closely
related to the separation between religion and state. Nevertheless, these concepts concern
different things: while separation between religion and state is mostly concerned with the
institutional ties between state and religion, neutrality is rather a substantive ideal,
concerning the organisation and content of government policy.39 For example Norway in
Article 2 of its constitution states that “our values will remain our Christian and humanistic
heritage” (a decided endorsement of Christianity and its values) but was also evaluated to
be the tenth best country for human freedom in 2018.

40

Denmark, possesses a state

religion, but also manage to maintain low levels of communal violence and was evaluated
to be the sixth best country for human freedom in 2017.41 These states appear to be able
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to be neutral regarding matters of religious freedom. It could be argued that states such as
Norway and Denmark have managed to maintain high levels of freedom thus far because
until very recently these states have been largely ethnically and religiously homogenous. 42
There are instances where religious states, such as Denmark, possess a state religion, but
have historically maintained low levels of communal violence but with a recent influx of
immigrants belonging to different faiths, creeds, and ethnicities states like Denmark have
had their limits of tolerance for the religious practices other than their endorsed religion
tested. Denmark has in recent years seen an increase in intolerance and several public
policies viewed as discriminatory of minority groups. For example, in February 2014
Denmark banned halal and kosher meat.43
Sri Lanka on the other hand has historically been a multi-cultural country and has been
grappling with inter-community tensions for centuries. These inter-communal tensions have
festered over time and infested the political landscape as well. Relying on a religious state
to be religiously neutral is relying on the good faith of the state and of the government of
the day. In a state with a robust legal system – with properly implemented checks and
balances, low levels of corruption, and a well-oiled justice mechanism – relying on the good
faith on the government may not be problematic. In states where unwritten political norms
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and standards of behaviour are aligned with democratic values relying on the good faith of
the government would not be as risky. For relying on religious neutrality as a fix for a
conflict that exists within a constitution assumes that the government of the day will not
exploit the conflict of provisions for its own advantage. This requires a high degree of
public trust in state and government officials who have the power to act contrary to political
norms if they so wish. It appears that it would be far more transparent and ideologically
coherent for the state to be secular. However, secularism by itself is no guarantee of
freedom for religious minorities and does not preclude communal violence. For example,
India – a multi-cultural, multi-religious secular state – has periodically experienced waves
of communal violence. In India in 2017, “Approximately one-third of state governments
enforced anti-conversion and/or anti-cow slaughter laws against non-Hindus, and mobs
engaged in violence against Muslims or Dalits whose families have been engaged in the
dairy, leather, or beef trades for generations, and against Christians for proselytizing.”44
As a logical process religious neutrality is the product of a separation between state and
religion. Although it is only when a state has no obligation or interests vested in a religion
or religions can it truly be neutral or impartial, the mere legal separation of state and
religion in the constitution of a state does not mean that a state is neutral towards all
religions within its territory. Many states make no mention of a specific religion or do not
endorse a religion but show de facto preference to a single religion. The Pew Research
Center cites Laos as an example. Noting that
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the constitution does not explicitly name Buddhism as an official state religion,
but says: “The State respects and protects all lawful activities of Buddhists and
of followers of other religions, [and] mobilizes and encourages Buddhist monks
and novices as well as the priests of other religions to participate in activities
that are beneficial to the country and people.” In practice, the government
sponsors Buddhist facilities, promotes Buddhism as an element of the country’s
identity, and uses Buddhist ceremonies and rituals in state functions. Buddhism
also is exempted from some restrictions that apply to other religious groups.
For example, the government allows the printing, import and distribution of
Buddhist religious material while restricting the publication of religious
materials for most other religious groups. 45
This state behaviour is very similar to the de facto relationship between Buddhism and the
Sri Lankan state.
Any claim at religious neutrality by a state that has a legal obligation or duties to a religion
or religions is an act of duplicity since the state is feigning a secular or neutral outlook,
when in fact it is neither secular nor truly neutral. For this reason, the state of human rights
in states that endorse or prefer a particular religion is more precarious than in states that
possess an official state religion. Any constitution that requires a government or state to
feign neutrality, to pretend to be something it is fundamentally not, is not a transparent,
straight-forward document. For example, the Constitution of Sri Lanka guarantees equality
to men and women. Women in Sri Lanka believed that they possessed the same rights as
men. According to a Ministry of Finance spokesperson (the ministry which originally
repealed the ban) “the idea was to restore gender neutrality”. 46 However the ban on
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women’s ability to consume alcohol in a tavern was re-imposed in the name of Buddhist
values, values which are seemingly protected by the Constitution. This duplicity is also an
obstacle to the public’s constitutional literacy and public conceptions of the rights the public
believe they possess. However, there are problems in defining the baseline of neutrality as
a measure to understand when governments are not being neutral.47

Flavours of Neutrality
A state’s attitude to religion indicates whether the state will firstly, draw from religion and
religious ideology to direct its action or secondly, be willing to grant religious practices
exceptions. Schwartzman uses two questions to assess a state’s attitude to religion in general:
(i) Is state action justified by a secular purpose or by a religious belief? (ii) Does religiously
motivated conduct receive constitutional exemptions from general laws?48 These questions
may receive fairly straightforward answers in states which are clearly either theocratic or
secular. For example, the decriminalisation of homosexuality and the legalization of samesex marriage in a state would be a good indicator of whether state action in that state is
justified by a secular tradition. This would be a good indicator because most major religions
across the world are disapproving of homosexuality and same-sex marriage. Of course, an
exception to this would be where the major religion of the state has a history and doctrine
accepting homosexuality and same-sex unions.
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Formal, Substantive or a Competitive Market?
Ahdar and Leigh observe that in American religion-state jurisprudence two main models
of neutrality have emerged: formal neutrality, substantive neutrality, and the competitive
market model. 49 Formal neutrality “or ‘religion-blindness’ holds that the state should
engage with the religious believer without ‘seeing’ her faith,” while substantive neutrality
“is concerned with the consequences or effect or state action upon religion.”50 Applying
each of these types of neutrality to the same case would yield differing results. Adhar and
Leigh give the example of a Sikh motorcyclist wearing a turban required by law to wear a
safety helmet. If a state subscribed to formal neutrality, there would be no exception made
for the Sikh motorcyclist, while under substantive neutrality an exception would be made
for Sikhs who wear turbans.51 The difference in these approaches is the attitude of the state
to religion; under the formal neutrality approach, “religion is to be treated no differently
than anything else”, while under the substantive neutrality approach the government
minimizes its interference with religion and “strives to leave religion, as far as possible, to
individual choice.” Substantive neutrality is essentially protective of religion as a
phenomenon. Closely related to the substantive neutrality model is the competitive market
model that holds that religion is a matter of individual choice. This sub-model is premised
on the idea that “the encouragement of a ‘multiplicity of sects’ was desirable, “for where
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Rex J Ahdar & Ian Leigh. Religious Freedom in the Liberal State, ed (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009)
at 87.
50 Ahdar & Leigh note 84 at 88 and 89.
51 Ahdar & Leigh, note 84 at 88 and 90.
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there is a variety of sects, there cannot be a majority of any one sect to oppress and
persecute the rest’”.52
A question arises: under what type of neutrality are human rights most likely to be
protected? Prima facie, it appears that substantive neutrality is the most rights-friendly
approach because its fundamental belief is state non-interference in spheres of religion, and
its fundamental goal is the protection of religion. It appears this model is the most
conducive for full realisation of religious liberty. Under the substantive neutrality approach,
the state and religion occupy two spheres of control, and when those two spheres appear
to be in danger of colliding, the state gives way to religion. Of course, religion does not get
right of way in all matters that fall within area of convergence. There are core areas where
the state enforces its authority and precedence – for example matters relating to criminal
law. Even though Muslims in Sri Lanka are under Sharia law, the penal laws of Sharia do
not apply when it comes to a crime. But what happens when it is the religion that is violating
human rights? Why should states give way to religion? When religious practices and beliefs
interfere with modern, secular, jurisprudence designed to protect populations and
communities should state give way to religion, even when it means that some communities
and groups go unprotected? Are current constitutional dilemmas a result of treating
religion as special? Alas, an analysis of whether religion as a phenomenon and entity is
special is beyond the scope of this thesis. One may, however, examine the implications and
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Ahdar & Leigh, note 84 at 93 quoting Adams and Emmerich, A Nation Dedicated, 15, 47; Cookson,
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outcomes of what happens if a state treats religion as if it were special or treats religion as
if it were not special.

Protections for Minorities, Exceptionalism and Communalism
According to the above definitions it appears that the best way to identify what kind of
neutrality a state subscribes to is to identify whether a state makes exceptions for religious
communities. Sri Lanka has granted certain religions and ethnicities exceptions under its
law. These exceptions are exceptions from the general law wholesale regarding areas such
as marriage, maintenance and property. It appears that on paper that Sri Lanka, at least
partially, subscribes to the substantive neutrality approach due to the personal laws system
within Sri Lanka that gives minorities autonomy, the declaration by the courts that Sri
Lanka is a secular state, combined with the constitutional pledge to the freedom of religion,
equality and freedom from discrimination. However, we have seen in Chapter 3 above that

in reality Sri Lanka does not subscribe to substantive neutrality. In response to the dilemma
caused by the conflict of duties and as attempt at neutrality Sri Lanka created two modes
of protections for minorities apart from the protections guaranteed to them under the
fundamental rights chapter of the Constitution. The first kind of protection is legal, and the
second is political. The first kind of protection was created intentionally while the second
kind generated naturally.

The Personal Law System of Sri Lanka
The first kind of protection has created a legal system that allows religious communities
autonomy in certain arena, such as marriage, property, maintenance, and custody. These
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autonomous systems are considered the “personal laws” of those communities and apply
based on how an individual identifies themselves religiously (for example Sharia Law
automatically applies to those who identify as Muslim in Sri Lanka), or according to their
heritage (Kandyan Law and Tesawalamai Law in Sri Lanka). Legal systems that incorporate
personal law systems can be seen in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Singapore, Malaysia, Israel, and
South Africa, to name a few.53 Farrah Ahmed observes that “the personal law system is
often cited as a model of toleration and as a model for integrating minorities.” 54 The
personal law system in Sri Lanka originated under the colonial rule of the Dutch. According
to K. M. De Silva, while,
the laws and customs of the Tamils of Jaffa-patam were codified for the first
time in the Tesavalamai, and the Muslims had their own Islamic law, the
position with regard to the Sinhalese under Dutch rule is less clear. Significatly,
no such code of customary laws was compiled for the Sinhalese who formed a
clear majority of the people in the territories under the control of the V.O.C.
Evidently Sinhalese customary law had not the resilience and cohesiveness of
that of the Hindus and the Moors…By the last decade of the eighteenth century
the obsolescence of Sinhalese customary law was an established fact; RomanDutch law had superseded it.55
The lack of a codified customary law system for the Sinhalese may be one reason why Sri
Lanka has chosen its constitution as the space in which to pledge its allegiance to Buddhism.
Additionally, in 2014 Sri Lanka organized a conference on the theme of “Universalizing
Buddhist Jurisprudence”, which sought to make Buddhist readings of among other things,
Constitutional Law and human rights; Criminal Law, Family law and Environment Law,
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Farrah Ahmed, Religious freedom under the personal law system, ed (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
2015) at 194.
54 Ahmed, note 248 at 194. Ahmed here is speaking generally but her analysis centers on the personal law
system in India.
55 K M De Silva, note 48 at 194.
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and Commercial Law.56 However, we see that the personal law system creates a state of
exceptionalism for religious communities that are included in the personal law system. The
existence of these personal law provides a kind of autonomy to religious communities,
shielding their customs and practices from the view of the general law. While these laws
may be seen as a product of the religious freedoms granted by the constitution, the shield
of complete autonomy also hides the violation of fundamental rights committed against of
sections of citizens within those communities. For example, the Muslim Marriage and
Divorce Act No. 13 of 1951 (MMDA) governs marriage customs, property rights and
custodian rights of Muslim people and unlike the personal laws of other communities does
not allow those of the Muslim faith to opt out of the MMDA and opt in to the general
law57. These rights and duties are different from and sometimes contradict the general law.
For example, the age of marriage is 12 (without the permission of a Quazi) under Muslim
Law and 18 under the general law. Muslim children below the age of 12 may be permitted
to marry if a Quazi approves of it.58 Quazi court judges in Sri Lanka are exclusively men,
although in other states women have been permitted to act as Quazi judges. Muslim women
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57 General Marriage Ordinance No. 19 of 1907, short title: “An ordinance to consolidate and amend the law
relating to marriages other than the marriages of Muslims and to provide for the better registration thereof.”;
"The
Government
Information
Center",
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58 S. 23 of the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act No. 13 of 1951: “Notwithstanding anything in section 17, a
marriage contracted by a Muslim girl who has not attained the age of twelve years shall not be registered
under this Act unless the Quazi for the are in which the girl resides has, after such inquiry as he may deem
necessary, authorized the registration of the marriage.”
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activists are currently engaged in a struggle to amend the MMDA to provide greater legal
protections to women and children in Muslim communities.59
Similar special laws exist for a class of property belonging to Tamils, where Tamil women
originating in the Northern Peninsula cannot sell, transfer, or gift property they own without
their husband’s written consent under Thesawalamai Law. Additionally, under
Thesawalamai Law a married woman requires her husband’s consent to enter into
contracts.60 The codification of these special laws are an outcome of the Dutch attitude to
colonised legal systems, and the British Colonial Proclamation of 1799.61 The questions
arise: under what circumstances does the government have a duty to protect children in
communities shielded by archaic personal laws? Under what provisions is the government
empowered to interfere to protect vulnerable communities within minority and or religious
communities?
According to Udagama, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW Committee), the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the CRC
Committee and the CESCR,
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Smriti Daniel, "In Sri Lanka, Muslim women are fighting back against unfair marriage laws", (2016),
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have all consistently continued to comment at length on discrimination against
women under the existing customary and religious law regimes (the Kandyan,
Thesavalamai and Muslim Law regimes) that negate the impact of relatively
progressive provisions under the general law of the country. They have all
strongly criticized the possibility under Muslim Law of marriage of girls as
young as 12 if the parents consent.62
Secondly, politically, religions are overseen by separate ministries dedicated to individual
religions. For example, Buddhism is overseen by the Ministry of Buddha Sasana and
Christianity is overseen by the Ministry of Christian Affairs. These ministries are not standalone ministries but are added to the portfolio of a minister who has already received a
portfolio based on his or her religion. For example, the minister of sustainable development
and wildlife is also responsible for the religious affairs of Buddha Sasana; the minister of
prison reforms, rehabilitation, and resettlement is also responsible for Hindu religious
affairs; the minister of postal services is also responsible for Muslim religious affairs; and
the minister of tourism development is also responsible for Christian religious affairs.
There is doubt regarding how effective these ministries are at protecting the rights of these
minorities and whether there is any overlapping and conflicting jurisdiction.

Exceptionalism and Communalism
The Sri Lankan practice of treating different communities differently through mechanisms
such as the personal law system has given rise to exceptionalism which in turn leaves groups
of citizens without the protection of the state. For example, we saw above how no lower
limit applies for the marriageable age of Muslim girls, while under the General Marriages
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Ordinance the minimum age is eighteen.63 Importantly, the MMDA provision permitting
child marriage is exempt from s. 363 of the Penal Code of Sri Lanka which states that
sexual intercourse with a girl below the age of 16 (with or without her consent) amounts to
statutory rape.64 Why are Muslim girls alone exempt from the protection of the state in this
respect? Several commissions formulated to come to a consensus on reforms of Muslim
law in Sri Lanka have failed. The report of the latest commission (headed by a retired
Supreme Court judge) took nine years to be released and was at the last moment converted
into two reports that were contradictory to each other due to a lack of consensus within the
representatives of the Muslim community on the commission. It is clear that Sri Lanka’s
apparent adoption of a model of exceptionalism has caused harm to a portion of its
population and continues to cause harm due to a lack of consensus among communities.
By permitting minors to be married Sri Lanka has violated its duties under domestic and
international human rights provisions. In Chapter 3 we saw how exceptionalism further
affects groups within the majority religion such as child monks. The harms caused by the
model of exception raise serious concerns regarding costs of the system versus the benefits
of the systems. The question arises: is exceptionalism really the best way to ensure that
religious freedom is ensured?
Additionally, this method of looking at ethno-religious communities as separate, selfcontained, autonomous units has also given rise to communalism. It is fairly common for
political parties in Sri Lanka to be formed along ethno-religious lines. Although Sri Lanka
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possesses two main political parties, the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka
Freedom Party (SLFP), these parties often do not wield enough seats in parliament by
themselves to hold a strong majority.65 The members of the UNP and the SLFP are largely
Sinhalese and Buddhist. The UNP is considered to be more oriented towards the West and
liberal values, while the SLFP is considered to be more conservative. Sri Lanka’s main
parties also have a history of close ties with Buddhist monks. S. J. Tambiah writes that
Buddhist monks belonging to all three nikaya [denominations] may band
together to form special-interest associations with a political agenda. Their
membership is therefore tri-nikaya, and they have known links to political
parties and may thus be acknowledged as branches or components of the UNP,
SLFP, MEP, JVP, and so on66
It is also common for victors of elections to call upon the Chief Prelates of the nikayas to
pay obeisance or to solicit advice or blessings during times of difficulty for the country.
These visits are often televised and reported in the media. A visibly close relationship
between the Buddhist leadership and “secular” leadership not only exists but is advertised.
Also, a less common, but not infrequent sight is political leaders paying their respects at
Hindu kovils. However, the relationship between political leaders and Hindu religious
leaders appear to be courtesy visits and are not similar to political leaders’ relationship with
Buddhist monks.
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66 Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah. Buddhism betrayed?: religion, politics, and violence in Sri Lanka , ed (Chicago:
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Sri Lanka’s other major parties are the JVP (a Communist party that possessed a Sinhala
nationalist military-wing known as the Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya (DJV) [the Patriotic
Liberation Organization] involved in the 1987 communal riots), the Tamil National
Alliance (TNA), and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC). They are all crucial players
in national politics to form coalitions and alliances. Community based political parties that
are formed along ethno-religious lines usually act in the sole interest of the communities
they represent. While this may assist in bringing minority issues to the fore in parliament
and in political discourse, and serve to unify communities, politics along communal lines
may ultimately provide an artificial single voice to a community of individuals of diverse
views. However, it is possible for groups within communal political parties that disagree
with the standpoint of the major party to splinter away and create their own party. For
example, the All Ceylon Makkal Congress (ACMC) was created by a group of politicians
who decided to separate from the SLMC. However, the separation was a result of internal
political disagreement rather than an ideological or policy-based disagreement.
Additionally, this division along communal lines also serves to “other” minority
representatives from major political parties. Such political parties may also need to form
uneasy coalitions to ensure the realisation of their preferred policies. For example, the
SLMC sided with Mahinda Rajapakse’s Sinhala Nationalist SLFP in 2006.67 According to
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Uyangoda, “one key development that occurred…in Sri Lankan politics is the entry of
Buddhist monks into the electoral process.” 68 A group of Buddhist monks formed a
political party named the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) in 2004 and according to to
Uyangoda, “[t]heir mandate, as they themselves see it, is to protect the interests of the
Sinhalese-Buddhist majority ethnic community. In the broad political spectrum of the
country, these political monks represent a particularly militant stream of Sinhalese
nationalist mobilization.”69 There are no signs that this communalism is abating, especially
in the wake of the Easter bombings of April 2019, there is increased suspicion, hostility and
communal violence between communities.

issues relate to the political aspirations and the security of the Muslims in the eastern districts of Sri Lanka,
namely, Amparai, Batticaloa and Trincomalee.”
68 Jayadeva Uyangoda. “Sri Lanka: State of Research on Democracy” (2009) 1:1-2 PCD Journal 97 at 114.
69 Uyangoda, note 241 at 114.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this thesis I have shown how through the example of Sri Lanka, that a religion becomes
dominant through the endorsement of rulers and eventually becomes an institution vying
for political power. I have explained how that dominant religion has been used to create a
nationalist mythos and use it to oppress minorities. When Sri Lanka was liberated from
colonial rule, it found itself in an identity crisis. On one hand there was the modern state it
desired to be with the recognition of human rights and on the other hand there was the
legacy of a Sinhala Buddhist mythos. I then explored how this led to a conflict of duties
when the constitution tried to guarantee people human rights while giving foremost place
to Buddhism. I analysed four instances where Sri Lanka’s duty to human rights conflicts
with its duty to protect and foster Buddhism. I finally investigated how minority religions
have competed with the dominant religion for political power and how this has resulted in
conflicting legal systems meant for each community.
The duty to protect Buddhism is deeply entrenched in the historical fabric of Sri Lanka. In
this context the constitutional mechanisms that place a duty upon the government to protect
religious (and ethnic) minorities are a result of years of pushing and shoving to achieve a
few compromises. These compromises have generally shown themselves to be inadequate
and leave much room for manoeuvring in the courts to the disadvantage of minority
religious communities. Even where the state has granted autonomy to ethno-religious
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communities to govern their affairs such as instances of personal laws, these laws serve to
victimise minority groups within minority groups -- with no hope of state support. The
crucial questions are: are the current mechanisms enough? Is it merely a question of the
implementation of the law? The answer is “no”. The ambiguity of the law means that the
implementation of the law is a confusing issue. Significant over-arching reform is necessary
to ensure a cohesive framework for the protection of minority rights. One way to begin this
is by the state removing ambiguity regarding the status of religious minorities and decisively
addressing Sri Lanka’s (supposed) status as a secular state. Article 9 of the Constitution is
intentionally ambiguous and misleading. In Chapter 3 we saw how this created difficulties
for the Supreme Court and the court’s reticence to rule substantively on religious freedom.
However, the act of clarifying the nature of Sri Lanka’s relationship with Buddhism by itself
will not solve or heal Sri Lanka’s communal tensions. It appears that Sri Lanka’s actual
problem is with how it deals with and compromises with its majority religion and ethnicity,
with its minority communities, with liberal democratic values, with the international
community, with its history, with its identity as a nation, and with its vision for a way
forward.
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